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STRICKLAND-LITE: PADILLA’S TWO-TIERED DUTY FOR 
NONCITIZENS 
CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ* 
ABSTRACT 
 The quarter-century-old ineffective assistance of counsel framework 
announced in Strickland v. Washington recognizes a Sixth 
Amendment duty to investigate the law and facts underlying a 
criminal defendant’s legal predicament.  In Padilla v. Kentucky 
the Supreme Court of the United States for the first time extended the 
Strickland analysis to cover the right of noncitizen defendants to 
receive information about the immigration consequences of a 
conviction.  Faced with the competing considerations of providing 
noncitizen criminal defendants with critical information about 
immigration consequences, on the one hand, and the burden on 
defense attorneys of researching immigration law, on the other hand, 
this Article argues that the Court split the difference and invented a 
“Strickland-lite” duty.  Under Strickland-lite, the Court failed to 
require that criminal defense attorneys investigate the law and facts 
relevant to immigration consequences as fully as it has long required 
attorneys to do when investigating other aspects of a criminal case, 
including even immigration law provisions central to guilt or 
punishment.  This Article locates Padilla within a quarter-century 
of Strickland analyses and contends that the new Strickland-lite 
approach conflicts with Strickland’s mandate and fails to remedy 
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the problem of inaccurate advice for noncitizen criminal defendants 
that Padilla purports to remedy. 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Constitution’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel1 sits 
at the messy intersection of criminal procedure and immigration law.2  
Criminal procedure scholars frequently lament the unrealized 
promise of the right to counsel.3  As interpreted by courts, they claim, 
the right to the assistance of counsel in defending against criminal 
                                                        
 1.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). 
 2.  See Dana Leigh Marks, Still a Legal “Cinderella”? Why the Immigration Courts Remain 
an Ill-Treated Stepchild Today, 59 FED. LAWYER 25, 27 (2012) (noting the opinion of the Su-
preme Court of the United States “reject[ing] the state court’s finding that erroneous ad-
vice about immigration consequences is merely ‘collateral’ and thus not covered by the 
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel”); see also Daniel Kan-
stroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The Challenging Construction of 
the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1473–74 (2011) (explaining how, 
following Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), deportation has been 
neither categorically covered by nor categorically removed from the umbrella of Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel); see also Aarti Kohli, Does the Crime Fit the Punishment?: Recent 
Judicial Actions Expanding the Rights of Noncitizens, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 1, 11, 13 (2011) 
(noting that “[t]he [Padilla] Court concludes that an immigration consequence is in a 
unique category under the ‘ambit’ of the Sixth Amendment,” and positing that Padilla may 
be an indication that the Court “may be open to expanding Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth 
Amendment rights in immigration proceedings”); Maritza I. Reyes, Constitutionalizing Im-
migration Law: The Vital Role of Judicial Discretion in the Removal of Lawful Permanent Residents, 
84 TEMP. L. REV. 637, 651 (2012) (noting that Padilla has implications for criminal and 
immigration proceedings). 
 3.  See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal 
Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 783–84 (ex-
plaining how, despite the constitutionally established right to counsel, wealth disparities 
create a troubling barrier to equal justice and little is being done to remedy this disparity); 
William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of 
the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 147–48 (1995) (highlighting how practi-
cal application of the Strickland doctrine has produced acutely harmful consequences for 
capital defendants on appeal); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Con-
stitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 
NEB. L. REV. 425, 427 (1996) (“Unfortunately, indigent criminal defendants are not always 
provided with competent appointed counsel.  Sometimes they are not even appointed at-
torneys who remain alert or sober during trial.”). 
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charges lacks the jurisprudential muscle necessary for it to function as 
a true bulwark against the state’s prosecutorial power.4  Instead, as 
one scholar claimed, it is a “lethal fiction”5—a promise of protection 
fallen victim to overly narrow interpretations of its meaning and 
purpose.6  By contrast, immigration law scholars and attorneys 
routinely pine for the protections that the Sixth Amendment’s Right 
to Counsel Clause offers.7  If courts made a realistic assessment of 
immigration law today, these attorneys claim, the Sixth Amendment 
would protect the rights of individuals in immigration proceedings, 
thereby increasing the likelihood that noncitizens would be removed 
from the United States because it is required by law, not solely 
                                                        
 4.  See Bruce A. Green, “Through a Glass, Darkly”: How the Court Sees Motions to Disqualify 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1235 (1989) (recounting the historical 
evolution of the Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment and properly noting that 
the Court has only recently interpreted the Sixth Amendment to encompass the effective 
assistance of counsel). 
 5.  Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of “Counsel” in the Sixth Amendment, 78 
IOWA L. REV. 433, 433 (1993). 
 6.  See Steve Zeidman, Padilla v. Kentucky: Sound and Fury, or Transformative Impact, 39 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 203, 211–12 n.35 (2011) (providing support for the proposition that, 
while ineffective assistance of counsel is typically the most common argument raised by 
defendants on appeal, it is rarely successful); see also Yolanda Vázquez, Realizing Padilla’s 
Promise: Ensuring Noncitizen Defendants Are Advised of the Immigration Consequences of a Crimi-
nal Conviction, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 169, 179–80 (2011) [hereinafter Vázquez, Realizing 
Padilla’s Promise] (lamenting the Strickland standard’s practical failings, whose “strict and 
narrow view” has made it nearly impossible for defendants to prevail on ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims). 
 7.  See, e.g., Cyrus D. Mehta, Right to Appointed Counsel in Removal Proceedings? The Su-
preme Court May Have Opened the Door in Turner v. Rogers, INSIGHTFUL IMMIGR. BLOG (June 
29, 2011, 9:16 PM), http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2011/06/right-to-appointed-counsel-in-
removal.html (“The Sixth Amendment clearly grants an indigent defendant the right to 
state appointed counsel in a criminal case, Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and so 
why not the same right to a non-citizen in a removal case?”); Maureen A. Sweeney, Where 
Do We Go from Padilla v. Kentucky? Thoughts on Implementation and Future Directions, 45 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 353, 366 (2011) (arguing that Padilla “severely undermined [the] fundamen-
tal principle that deportation was not a penalty but a remedial, civil sanction,” and thus 
that there may be “implications for the right to counsel in crime-related deportation pro-
ceedings under the Sixth Amendment”); Maria Teresa Rojas, A “Gideon Decision” for Immi-
grants, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND. BLOG (Apr. 7, 2010), http://blog.soros.org/2010/04/a-
gideon-for-immigrants (reporting that one immigrants’ rights advocate said about Padilla: 
“‘In some ways, this is the Gideon v Wainwright. for immigrants.’”). 
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because it is the inevitable byproduct of pro se proceedings or, just as 
troubling, of incompetent representation.8 
In Padilla v. Kentucky,9 the Supreme Court of the United States 
took a significant—and surprising—turn in the latter direction.10  
Noncitizen criminal defendants, the Court held, are constitutionally 
entitled to advice about the potential deportation consequences of a 
conviction prior to entering a guilty plea.11  Failure to do so may 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, allowing a noncitizen to 
collaterally attack the criminal conviction and, with that, erase the 
basis for removal from the United States.12  It has now become clear 
that Padilla marks a turning point in the procedural protections 
afforded noncitizen criminal defendants.13  For the many noncitizen 
                                                        
 8.  See Aliza B. Kaplan, A New Approach to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Removal Pro-
ceedings, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 347 (2010) (“Without an appropriate and flexible reme-
dy for ineffective assistance of counsel, deportation decisions are less likely to be based on 
an accurate review of the law and the facts . . . and more likely to be based on the compe-
tence, or lack thereof, of a hired attorney.”). 
 9.  559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 10.  See Vázquez, Realizing Padilla’s Promise, supra note 6, at 175 (resolving a prior divide 
among jurisdictions, Padilla articulated a new Sixth Amendment duty requiring defense 
attorneys to describe to their clients the immigration consequences of a criminal convic-
tion). 
 11.  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. 
 12.  See Dana Leigh Marks & Denise Noonan Slavin, A View Through the Looking Glass: 
How Crimes Appear from the Immigration Court Perspective, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 91, 113–14 
(2011) (emphasizing that a vacated conviction on the basis of a procedural defect may no 
longer be considered a conviction for immigration purposes); see also In re Adamiak, 23 I. 
& N. Dec. 878, 879–81 (B.I.A. 2006) (holding that a state conviction vacated for failure to 
advise about the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction could not serve as the 
basis for removal). 
 13.  See Maurice Hew, Jr., Under the Circumstances: Padilla v. Kentucky Still Excuses Fun-
damental Fairness and Leaves Professional Responsibility Lost, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 31, 62 
(2012) (highlighting that Padilla illustrates the Court’s acknowledgement that “deporta-
tion is an integral part—indeed sometimes the most important part—of the penalty”); Ra-
chel E. Rosenbloom, Will Padilla Reach Across the Border?, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 327, 328 
(2011) (same); see also Christopher Gowen & Erin Magary, Collateral Consequences: How Reli-
able Data and Resources Can Change the Way Law is Practiced, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 65, 71 
(2011) (describing how the Court’s shift in Padilla to describing deportation consequences 
as “integral” as opposed to “collateral” more perfectly aligns with the reality faced by 
noncitizens with criminal records (internal quotation marks omitted)); Peter L. Marko-
witz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1349–50 (2011) (articulating that 
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criminal defendants whose most precious goal is to remain in the 
United States, Padilla offers a layer of procedural protection between 
life in a place they know and life in a place they hope to avoid.14 
A criminal defense attorney is now constitutionally obligated to 
review the noncitizen defendant’s predicament and advise about 
immigration troubles that clearly lay ahead.15  This is no minor 
guarantee.  Before Padilla, noncitizen criminal defendants frequently 
proceeded through the criminal justice system blind as to how these 
proceedings might impact their immigration status.16  The cutting-
edge practices of the criminal defense bar trended toward advising 
about immigration consequences,17 but, prior to Padilla, untold 
numbers of defense attorneys did not consider immigration 
consequences as a matter of course.18  Immigration consequences 
largely remained the province of immigration law attorneys.19  
                                                        
Padilla marks the first step in the Court recognizing that deportation lies between both the 
civil and criminal realms). 
 14.  See Vázquez, Realizing Padilla’s Promise, supra note 6, at 170–71 (“[Padilla] affords 
thousands of noncitizen immigrants a right that may protect their ability to remain in this 
country.”). 
 15.  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (explaining how, even where the law may not be so suc-
cinct, a criminal defense attorney must still advise a noncitizen criminal defendant that the 
pending charges may result in deportation). 
 16.  To illustrate the sheer magnitude of deportations, a pair of scholars noted that 
“[m]ore than 128,000 noncitizens with criminal convictions were deported in 2009.”  Gary 
Proctor & Nancy King, Post Padilla: Padilla’s Puzzles for Review in State and Federal Courts, 23 
FED. SENT’G REP. 239, 239 (2011). 
 17.  Scott E. Bratton, Representing a Noncitizen in a Criminal Case, THE CHAMPION, 
Jan./Feb. 2007, at 61; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUSTICE: PLEAS OF 
GUILTY STANDARD 14-3.2(f) (3d. ed. 1999) (“To the extent possible, defense counsel 
should determine and advise the defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of any 
plea, as to the possible collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the con-
templated plea.”). 
 18.  See Kara Hartzler, “Do I Have to Learn What a Crime of Moral Turpitude Is?”: The World 
Before and After Padilla v. Kentucky, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 66, 66 (2011) (explaining how 
some defense attorneys “struggled in vain to provide accurate advice on a byzantine field 
of law,” while “others avoided the issue altogether”). 
 19.  See id. (explaining how, prior to Padilla, defense attorneys typically adopted one of 
two approaches with regard to advising on immigration: either (1) the defense attorney 
recognized the importance of advising and would seek advice from an immigration expert, 
or (2) the defense attorney would refrain from answering immigration questions that 
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Without a recognized right to appointment of counsel in immigration 
court, the reality was that many noncitizen criminal defendants 
navigated their criminal and immigration proceedings without 
guidance on the immigration pitfalls of their criminal charge and 
conviction.20  The post-Padilla world is different.  Advice about 
immigration consequences, once a sign of a defense attorney going 
above and beyond, is now a constitutionalized minimum.21  The 
importance of this new reality, as Yolanda Vázquez aptly put it, is 
“immeasurable” to noncitizen defendants.22 
All, however, is not perfect.  Padilla purported merely to apply a 
long line of right-to-counsel cases to this new context, including 
Strickland v. Washington,23 the Court’s modern formulation of the 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test.24  Under the Strickland standard, 
the defendant must show two things: first, that counsel failed to 
function as “the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment” 
and second, that this “deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense.”25  Only by avoiding deficient representation, the rationale 
goes, can counsel facilitate “a reliable adversarial testing process.”26  
Though the Court has never identified a comprehensive list of 
requirements necessary to satisfy Strickland,27 it has repeatedly 
                                                        
properly fell within the province of an immigration lawyer upon the belief that immigra-
tion was a collateral consequence to a criminal conviction). 
 20.  See Yolanda Vázquez, Advising Noncitizen Defendants on the Immigration Consequences 
of Criminal Convictions: The Ethical Answer for the Criminal Defense Lawyer, the Court, and the 
Sixth Amendment, 20 LA RAZA L.J. 31, 32 (2010) (providing statistics illustrating the number 
of individuals removed and families separated by removal, and in turn stressing how alarm-
ing these statistics are in light of the reality that many of the convicted were unaware of the 
impact their conviction would have on their immigration status); see also Ira J. Kurzban, 
Criminalizing Immigration Law, in 42ND ANNUAL IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION 
INSTITUTE 321, 326 (2009). 
 21.  See Zeidman, supra note 6, at 208. 
 22.  Vázquez, Realizing Padilla’s Promise, supra note 6, at 200. 
 23.  466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 24.  See Richard P. Rhodes, Jr., Note, Strickland v. Washington: Safeguard of the Capital 
Defendant’s Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel?, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 121, 123 (1992) 
(noting that the Strickland Court “articulated a two-pronged test that defendants must ful-
fill to establish their counsels’ ineffectiveness”). 
 25.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
 26.  Id. at 688 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932)). 
 27.  See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (“We have declined to articulate 
specific guidelines for appropriate attorney conduct . . . .”). 
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discussed several duties that the right to counsel imposes upon 
criminal defense attorneys.28  Among these is the duty to investigate 
the law and facts relevant to a defendant’s predicament.29  Thorough 
investigation, the Court explained in Strickland and several subsequent 
decisions, allows the attorney to make “strategic choices” about the 
best defense strategy.30  Choices made after “less than complete 
investigation of the relevant law and facts” or “a reasonable decision 
that makes particular investigations unnecessary” deprive the 
defendant of the counsel guaranteed under Strickland.31 
This Article will argue that Padilla purports to faithfully apply 
Strickland, but in fact lowers the right-to-counsel duty to investigate law 
and facts in the context of advice about immigration consequences.32  
Instead of requiring criminal defense attorneys to hone their skills by 
grappling with the nuances of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”)33 and the volumes of precedential decisions interpreting its 
provisions, Padilla allows attorneys to provide legal advice to 
noncitizen defendants without first unraveling the complexities of 
crime-based removal.34  The Padilla Court announced that “when the 
                                                        
 28.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (outlining certain basic duties—to remain loyal, 
avoid conflicts of interest, advocate for defendant’s cause, and consult with the defendant 
on important decisions—while maintaining that any case presenting an ineffectiveness 
claim must be decided based on whether counsel’s assistance was “reasonable considering 
all the circumstances”). 
 29.  See id. at 690–91 (emphasizing that counsel’s investigations must be “reasonable” 
and that any decision not to investigate must be “directly assessed for reasonableness . . . , 
applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments”). 
 30.  Id.; see Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521–22 (relying on Strickland to emphasize the “defer-
ence” owed “strategic judgments” for the purpose of determining the adequacy of coun-
sel’s investigation). 
 31.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91; see Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524–25 (explaining that 
counsel’s investigation fell short of both Maryland professional standards and ABA stand-
ards, and further distinguishing the case from prior precedents in which the Court found 
counsel’s limited investigations into mitigating evidence to be reasonable). 
 32.  This Article fits within a small but growing body of literature that acknowledges 
Padilla’s value while taking a critical look at its shortcomings.  See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, 
Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1395–96 (2011); Vázquez, Realiz-
ing Padilla’s Promise, supra note 6, at 170–71; Zeidman, supra note 6, at 204, 226. 
 33.  Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8 U.S.C.). 
 34.  See Hew, supra note 13, at 32 (acknowledging that the “scope of Padilla’s attorney 
performance mandate, however, is limited to situations where pertinent immigration con-
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deportation consequence is truly clear . . . the duty to give correct 
advice is equally clear.”35  But the Court also noted that “[w]hen the 
law is not succinct and straightforward . . . a criminal defense attorney 
need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending 
criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration 
consequences.”36  In effect, the Court adopted a two-tiered duty. If 
deportation is a “truly clear” consequence, then a defense attorney 
must tell the defendant as much.37  If, however, “the law is not 
succinct and straightforward,” then there is no need to unpack its 
messy nuances; instead, an attorney need only advise the defendant 
that a conviction “may carry a risk of adverse immigration 
consequences.”38 
Unlike the duty to thoroughly investigate matters related to 
criminal liability or even sentencing, the “Strickland-lite” duty to 
investigate immigration consequences allows an attorney to cease 
investigation for reasons completely unrelated to a calculation that 
further investigation would yield the defendant no additional 
benefit.39  Padilla sanctions ending investigation of immigration 
                                                        
sequences are ‘truly clear’” (citation omitted)); Nicholas D. Thornton, The Failing Promise 
of Padilla: How Padilla v. Kentucky Should Have Changed the Game in North Dakota, but Did 
Not, 87 N.D. L. REV. 85, 99 (2011) (“In the case of unclear immigration concerns, the 
Court noted the scope and nature of a criminal defense attorney’s advice would be lim-
ited, which implicitly suggests that the client should seek counsel from an immigration at-
torney.”); Malia Brink, A Gauntlet Thrown: The Transformative Potential of Padilla v. Kentucky, 
39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 39, 48 (2011) (explaining that certain criminal convictions trigger 
automatic deportation, whereas the consequences of other criminal convictions are far less 
clear).  For a thorough explanation of Padilla’s breadth, see César Cuauhtémoc García 
Hernández, Criminal Defense After Padilla v. Kentucky, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. (forthcoming) 
[hereinafter García Hernández, After Padilla]. 
 35.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010). 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id.  In a similar vein, Vázquez describes Padilla’s duty as “limited” in scope.  See 
Vázquez, Realizing Padilla’s Promise, supra note 6, at 188 (“While the Court successfully cre-
ated a Sixth Amendment duty to advise as to the immigration consequences of a criminal 
conviction, it limited that duty.”). 
 39.  See Hew, supra note 13, at 48–51 (arguing that criminal defense attorneys should 
inform their clients of other immigration consequences, including mandatory detention, 
travel restrictions, and limitations on naturalization, which do not fall within Padilla’s 
mandate); Vázquez, Realizing Padilla’s Promise, supra note 6, at 189 (noting that Padilla al-
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consequences upon realizing that the relevant law is complex, 
regardless of whether further investigation would be beneficial.40  
Nowhere else in the duty-to-investigate case law can one find such an 
end point.41 
Padilla’s peril does not, however, begin there.  The Padilla 
Court’s narrow conceptualization of “investigation” means that in 
some instances attorneys will provide constitutionally sound advice 
that nonetheless misleads defendants.42 Even in situations in which 
deportation is “truly clear,” as Padilla envisions that phrase, attorneys 
will not accurately inform defendants of their likelihood to remain in 
the United States.43 
                                                        
lows a “generic advisement” when the immigration consequence of conviction is unclear, 
which adversely impacts a defense attorney’s ability to negotiate a more favorable plea). 
 40.  See Hew, supra note 13, at 49 (“While the Padilla majority noted that defense coun-
sel must notify the defendant of deportation when its threat is truly clear, the Court should 
have specifically identified potential mandatory detention as another area worthy of no-
tice.”); Vázquez, Realizing Padilla’s Promise, supra note 6, at 189 (noting that Padilla may ad-
versely impact a defendant’s leverage during plea negotiations). 
 41.  See, e.g., Pavel v. Hollins, 261 F.3d 210, 218–19 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that an at-
torney’s decision to end the case investigation by failing to call important witnesses be-
cause of a desire to save time and effort provided support for an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim).  Importantly, however, the Sixth Amendment does not reach collateral 
consequences of conviction, and thus, the duty to investigate does not apply.  See Gabriel J. 
Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty 
Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 703–04 (2002) (explaining the collateral consequences rule 
and observing that courts have not explained how the rule “fits into the system for evaluat-
ing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel”).  Padilla clarified that the direct versus col-
lateral consequence distinction does not apply to deportation concerns.  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 
at 1482; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 381 S.W.3d 322, 325 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (acknowledg-
ing the Supreme Court’s rejection of the “direct” and “collateral” distinction “in the con-
text of immigration consequences”).  
 42.  Cf. Vázquez, Realizing Padilla’s Promise, supra note 6, at 190 (“By excusing defense 
attorneys from providing information about the immigration consequences of a conviction 
or plea to their noncitizen defendants when the law is not clear, Padilla will deprive certain 
noncitizen defendants of advice and performance that the Padilla Court itself recognized 
to be of paramount importance.”). 
 43.  See infra Part III.C; see also Hew, supra note 13, at 48 (“If the client wishes to remain 
in the United States . . . the criminal defense attorney must explain the immigration con-
sequences of a plea—other than just the certainty of removal . . . .”). 
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For all its value to noncitizen criminal defendants, then, Padilla 
falls short of its full potential.44  By allowing attorneys to cease 
investigating the applicable law and facts of a criminal prosecution 
without considering every nuance or upon a realization that the “law 
is not succinct and straightforward,” Padilla threatens to leave many 
noncitizen defendants in much the same position as before this 
landmark decision—forced to decide whether to plead guilty based 
on incomplete or inaccurate advice about the deportation 
consequences of conviction.45  Adopting such a Strickland-lite 
standard, this Article will argue, presents dangers both for the 
noncitizen defendants whom the Padilla Court concerned itself with 
protecting and for the representation rights of criminal defendants 
more generally.46  Moreover, leaving noncitizen defendants with little 
protection places Padilla within a pattern of processes through which 
standard criminal prosecutions are shorn of key features that protect 
defendants, emblematized by Operation Streamline and fast-track 
plea agreements.47  Like these programs, Padilla allows criminal 
proceedings against noncitizen defendants to proceed en masse with a 
semblance of constitutional normalcy, while in reality deviating far 
from constitutional standards.48 
This Article will proceed in four parts.  Part I will survey the 
rationale underlying the right to counsel articulated in the twentieth-
century line of cases that includes Powell v. Alabama,49 Gideon v. 
Wainwright,50 and Strickland v. Washington.  The historical record 
captured in these cases and elsewhere, Part I will suggest, consistently 
evidences a conscious, if imperfect, desire to promote fairness and 
reliability in criminal proceedings by interjecting a skilled counselor 
between the state’s professional prosecutor and the defendant.  
Following this overview, Part II will closely examine how Strickland’s 
                                                        
 44.  See Vázquez, Realizing Padilla’s Promise, supra note 6, at 200 (“Although Padilla is a 
landmark case and will help many noncitizen defendants get information about the immi-
gration consequences of a criminal conviction, the opinion falls short of mandating that 
defense attorneys provide their noncitizen clients with the advice needed to prevent de-
portation in each and every case.”). 
 45.  See id. at 189 (opining that Padilla’s two-tiered test results in “a very generic, and 
often useless, warning” for noncitizen defendants). 
 46.  See infra Parts III, IV.B. 
 47.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 48.  See infra notes 417–419 and accompanying text. 
 49.  287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 50.  372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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duty to investigate has unraveled in subsequent Supreme Court cases 
and the lower courts.  Part II will contend that courts have steadfastly 
maintained a distinction between a defense attorney’s thoroughly 
investigated, strategic choices, which are constitutionally sound, and 
decisions that follow inattentive investigation, which have never 
received constitutional sanction.  Until Padilla that is. 
Part III will then turn to Padilla and its unique status within the 
Strickland duty to investigate body of case law.  Part III will display the 
complexity of the INA’s crime-based provisions and Padilla’s 
reluctance to push defense attorneys to navigate those complex 
waters.51  By allowing incompletely researched advice about criminal 
charges that are almost certain to lead to entry of a removal order, 
Padilla’s two-tiered standard denies noncitizen criminal defendants 
the counsel that is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  In some 
cases, the advice that Padilla mandates may be worse for the 
noncitizen than no advice at all, particularly when inaccuracies in 
information influence a noncitizen’s decisions in potentially 
detrimental ways.52 
Lastly, Part IV will contemplate Strickland-lite’s possible 
repercussions outside the realm of immigration consequences.  
Although the unique history of immigration law may have pushed the 
Padilla Court’s application of Strickland into the realm of immigration 
consequences, there is no guarantee that its Strickland-lite standard 
will remain within those confines.53  Indeed, history counsels that 
when constitutional protections as applied to immigrants begin to 
erode, that erosion later chips away at the core of the rights as applied 
to all.54  In this way, Strickland-lite threatens to erode the baseline Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of the right to assistance of counsel. 
I.  RIGHT-TO-COUNSEL RATIONALE 
The right to counsel has been at the core of criminal 
proceedings in the United States since before it became one of a 
handful of guaranties enacted to satisfy members of the founding 
                                                        
 51.  See infra Part III.A–B. 
 52.  See infra Part III.C. 
 53.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 54.  See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 988–1003 (2002) (provid-
ing “examples [that] illustrate how measures initially directed at immigrants can pave the 
way for incursions on citizens’ rights”). 
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generation who were wary of centralized state power.55  Over the 
course of the nation’s legal history, the right to counsel has constantly 
adapted to meet evolving criminal justice needs and expectations.56  
From meager origins to today’s far more expansive right to the 
appointment of an attorney, the counsel guarantee has been 
broadened to include protections not imagined at the time the Sixth 
Amendment was ratified.57  Padilla’s mandate regarding immigration 
consequences exemplifies this “constant, almost relentless 
expansion.”58 
This consistent expansion of the right to counsel reflects its 
central role in criminal proceedings.  As the Supreme Court 
explained in Lakeside v. Oregon59: “In an adversary system of criminal 
justice, there is no right more essential than the right to the assistance 
of counsel.”60 Adds Pamela R. Metzger: “[The right to counsel] is the 
tool by which our criminal justice system protects the accused, [and] 
secures a truly adversary proceeding.”61  In a similar vein, Justice Black 
wrote in his opinion for the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst62 that the right-
to-counsel provision “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious 
                                                        
 55.  See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61–65 (1932) (surveying right-to-counsel provi-
sions in colonial constitutions and statutes); John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The 
Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 9), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2037500 (“Even prior to the ratification of the Sixth 
Amendment, American colonies were much more liberal than English courts in their 
recognition of a right to counsel . . . .”). 
 56.  See Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-To-Counsel Doc-
trine, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1635, 1637 (2003) (“The counsel guarantee has never been a rigid 
or static doctrine.  Rather, it has been an evolving embodiment of the fair process norms 
of a given historical context.”). 
 57.  See King, supra note 55, at 9 (observing that “subsequent interpreters of the Sixth 
Amendment have found a right to counsel much broader than that foreseen by the Fram-
ers”).  Most notably, the constitutional provision was not originally thought to include ap-
pointment of counsel at the government’s expense.  FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 110–11 (Greenwood Press 1969). 
 58.  JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: A REFERENCE 
GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 34 (2002).  According to Tomkovicz, this 
expansion halted in the last quarter of the twentieth century.  Id. at 36. 
 59.  435 U.S. 333 (1978). 
 60.  Id. at 341. 
 61.  Metzger, supra note 56, at 1699. 
 62.  304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
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truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal 
skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to 
take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by 
experienced and learned counsel.”63 
The decision in Powell that the young, illiterate black defendants 
charged with raping two white women on a train in Jim Crow Alabama 
were entitled to counsel is, in effect, a recognition that even if the 
defendants had been given the time to prepare a defense, they could 
not have done so.64  The Court observed that the young men simply 
lacked the ability to speak on their own behalf in any way that might 
assist them in court or in any way that might shed light on the truth of 
what occurred on their fateful train ride, regardless of their actual 
culpability.65  In such situations, however, a defense attorney’s 
knowledge harnessed into the role of a “zealous, partisan advocate,” 
could equip the defendant with the necessary skill to mount a defense 
that would lead to a fair adversarial process.66  The “guiding hand of 
counsel,”67 as the Powell Court described the benefit of representation, 
ensures that a criminal prosecution does not become “‘a sacrifice of 
unarmed prisoners to gladiators.’”68  Inequality may exist,69 but 
                                                        
 63.  Id. at 462–63. 
 64.  See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49–52, 71–72 (1932) (reasoning that to deny 
aid of counsel to one who “is incapable adequately of making his own defense . . . would 
be to ignore the fundamental postulate . . . that there are certain immutable principles of 
justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union 
may disregard” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 65.  See id. at 52–53, 71 (noting “the ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants” and 
the fact that their families lived in other states, which makes it difficult for the defendants 
to secure counsel without “reasonable time and opportunity” to do so).   
 66.  See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 58, at 128–29 (“[A] lawyer’s assistance is essential be-
cause the accused has severe deficiencies and disabilities. . . . The adversarial contest 
would be grossly imbalanced and thus unfair without the equalizing presence of a legally 
trained assistant.”); see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985) (noting that the attor-
ney “must play the role of an active advocate” and that a “defendant’s liberty depends on 
his ability to present his case”). 
 67.  Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. 
 68.  United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 (1984) (quoting United States ex rel. 
Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 1975)). 
 69.  See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, The Right to Counsel in Death Penalty and Other Criminal 
Cases: Neglect of the Most Fundamental Right and What We Should Do About It, 11 J.L. & SOC’Y 1, 
3 (2010) (expressing concern that “[i]n many jurisdictions, the workloads of lawyers de-
fending the poor are so overwhelming, that it is impossible for them to give their clients 
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criminal liability, the counsel guarantee suggests, should not be 
imposed solely because the defendant was unable to utter a 
cognizable defense.70 
For all its lofty promises of evening the playing field between 
professional prosecutors and lay defendants, there was still no 
“guiding hand of counsel” available to those criminal defendants who 
could not afford to hire an attorney.71  It took almost 150 years after 
the Sixth Amendment’s enactment for right-to-counsel jurisprudence 
to finally recognize a constitutional right to appointed counsel; even 
then, this guarantee extended only to federal prosecutions.72  A 
quarter century later, in the watershed Gideon decision, the Supreme 
Court announced a right to appointed counsel in state 
prosecutions—a monumental extension if for no other reason than 
the dominant role of the states in imposing criminal liability.73  From 
                                                        
the individual attention they require” and that “[m]any court-appointed lawyers have no 
resources for investigation and expert assistance”). 
 70.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241 (1973) (“For without that right 
[to counsel], a wholly innocent accused faces the real and substantial danger that simply 
because of his lack of legal expertise he may be convicted.”); see also Mark Noferi, Cascad-
ing Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immi-
grants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 96–120 (2012) (identifying a 
series of cases in which the Supreme Court has expanded procedural due process protec-
tions in immigration proceedings to argue in favor of appointed counsel for detained im-
migrants pending removal proceedings). 
 71.  Powell, 287 U.S. at 69; see Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 
IND. L.J. 571, 573–74 (2005) (“[T]he word ‘indigent’ appears nowhere in the text of the 
Sixth Amendment, nor does the Amendment explicitly specify that the government will 
provide counsel to those who are impoverished or indigent.”). 
 72.  See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (stating that the Sixth Amendment 
requires federal courts to provide assistance of counsel unless a defendant waives the 
right); see also Gershowitz, supra note 71, at 574 (“During the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, the key Sixth Amendment question was whether the right to counsel should be ap-
plied to state defendants.  The early answer to this question was in the negative.”).  
 73.  See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); see What the Federal Courts Do, 
FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/autoframe?OpenForm&nav=menu 
2b&page=/federal/courts.nsf/page/CCA93B3B87C844BC85256C7900460860?opendocu
ment (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (“[M]ost criminal cases involve violations of state law and 
are tried in state court.”).  Gideon was doubly monumental because it overturned the 
Court’s decision twenty years earlier that the U.S. Constitution did not require states to 
furnish counsel for criminal defendants.  See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471–73 (1942), 
rev’d, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).  Illustrating the states’ dominant 
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1963, when Gideon was decided, to the present day, the Sixth 
Amendment has ensured that every individual charged with a non-
petty offense receives the benefit of counsel.74 
It would, of course, be improper to proclaim too highly the 
miracle of appointed counsel.  As Powell makes unmistakably clear, 
even appointing the entire local bar is meaningless if none of the 
attorneys actually function as an adversary to the prosecutor.75  Yet the 
Court did not, at that time, explicitly declare a Sixth Amendment 
quality-control criterion.  Not surprisingly, examples of ineffectual, 
pro-forma representation post-Powell are plentiful.76  It would be 
almost forty years after Powell, and seven after Gideon, until the Court 
explicitly enunciated, in Strickland, the test for establishing a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.77  Adding a qualitative component to 
the Sixth Amendment right, suggests one commentator, ensures that, 
“[i]n the adversarial battle, the defense lawyer serves as both an 
offensive ‘sword’ and a defensive ‘shield’ for the defendant.”78  This is 
perhaps more idealistic a portrayal of Sixth Amendment case law than 
                                                        
role in prosecuting alleged criminal activity, in fiscal year 2009 the United States Attor-
neys’ offices nationwide filed 67,864 cases, while there were approximately twenty million 
cases filed in state courts. EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED 
STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 9 fig.2.2 (2010); R. 
LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2009 STATE 
COURT CASELOADS 19–20 (2011), available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/Flash 
Microsites/CSP/images/CSP2009.pdf. 
 74.  See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007) (“In Gideon . . . the Court held 
that counsel must be appointed for any indigent defendant charged with a felony.”).  Im-
portantly, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as 
prohibiting imprisonment without counsel; thus, punishment short of imprisonment is 
permissible without the benefit of counsel.  Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979). 
 75.  See Powell, 287 U.S. at 59 (“It is not enough to assume that counsel . . . precipitated 
into the case thought there was no defense, and exercised their best judgment in proceed-
ing to trial without preparation. . . . No attempt was made to investigate.  No opportunity 
to do so was given.”); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (“That a 
person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however, is not 
enough to satisfy the constitutional command.”). 
 76.  See, e.g., David Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 
(1973) (providing examples of shoddy defense representation). 
 77.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (outlining a two-part test for a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, which requires (1) a “show[ing] that counsel’s performance was de-
ficient,” and (2) a “show[ing] that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense”). 
 78.  TOMKOVICZ, supra note 58, at 49. 
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is merited.  Indeed, subsequent case law has provided plenty of 
fodder for criticism.79  Still, through the concrete mechanisms 
discussed in Part II, the Court’s recognition “that the right to counsel 
is the right to the effective assistance of counsel”80 can be said to have 
meaningfully improved some criminal proceedings. 
II.  DUTY TO INVESTIGATE 
Despite the simplicity of the constitutional text—ensuring “the 
assistance of counsel”—the right to counsel has evolved into a multi-
faceted obligation.  As the Strickland Court explained, 
“[r]epresentation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic 
duties.”81  Although the Supreme Court refused to provide an 
exhaustive list of requirements, it did identify several broad duties 
imposed upon a criminal defense attorney to “assist the defendant,” 
which include “advocat[ing] the defendant’s cause[,] . . . consult[ing] 
with the defendant on important decisions[,] and . . . keep[ing] the 
defendant informed of important developments in the course of the 
prosecution.”82  The Court also noted that criminal defense attorneys 
should remain loyal to the defendant and avoid a conflict of interest, 
“bring[ing] to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a 
reliable adversarial testing process.”83  Last, but most relevant here, 
the Court observed that defense attorneys have a duty to investigate.84 
The adversarial process would not function properly were 
defense counsel not required to investigate the strength of the 
prosecution’s case and search for possible defense strategies.85  
                                                        
 79.  See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1259 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(“[P]ractical experience establishes that the Strickland test, in application, has failed to 
protect a defendant’s right to be represented by something more than ‘a person who hap-
pens to be a lawyer.’” (citation omitted)); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsi-
ness: The Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Re-
quirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 426–27 (1996) (providing examples of how the Strickland 
standard “allow[s] slipshod representation of indigent defendants”).  
 80.  McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
 81.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 690–91; see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1406–07 (2011) (reiter-
ating the duty to investigate); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (reiterating the 
duty to advocate the defendant’s cause and remain loyal to the defendant). 
 85.  Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986). 
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Without investigation, counsel proceeds blindly, relying on little more 
than guesswork.  In effect, without “thorough-going investigation and 
preparation” or a reasonable decision to stop investigating,86 an 
attorney cannot effectively serve the defendant as an advocate before 
the prosecutor or the court.87  To avoid this outcome, Strickland 
mandated that “counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations 
or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 
unnecessary.”88 
Investigation by counsel is necessary precisely because the 
attorney brings special skills and knowledge to the defense unit.89  
While the defendant may have access to critical facts, that information 
is effectively useless if it is not paired with the defense attorney’s 
ability to determine how those facts ought to be handled to best assist 
the defendant.90  Criminal law and procedure, implied the Powell 
Court, is far too complicated for a layperson to comprehend with the 
skill necessary to mount an adequate defense.91 
                                                        
 86.  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 
 87.  See Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384 (explaining that the “adversarial testing process 
generally will not function properly unless defense counsel has done some investigation”).  
Indeed, several of the Padilla amici made this point in urging the Court to adopt an inter-
pretation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel that requires exploration of potential 
immigration consequences of conviction.  Brief for the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Padilla v. Kentucky 559 U.S. 
356, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651), 2009 WL 1567356, at *16–17. 
 88.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984); see Jenny Roberts, Too Little, 
Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Crimi-
nal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1106 (2004) (“[T]o provide effective assistance of 
counsel consistent with the Sixth Amendment, defense counsel has a duty to investigate 
the case.”). 
 89.  See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Clinics in the Pursuit of Immigrant Rights: Lessons 
from the Loncheros, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 91, 112–16 (2012) (explaining that the contem-
porary criminal defense attorney helps defendants navigate proceedings and considera-
tions outside of what is typically thought of as criminal law and procedure). 
 90.  TOMKOVICZ, supra note 58, at 136. 
 91.  See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932) (“Even the intelligent and edu-
cated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. . . .  He lacks both the 
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense . . . .”); see also Scott R. Grubman, I 
Want My (Immigration) Lawyer! The Necessity of Court-Appointed Immigration Counsel in Criminal 
Prosecutions After Padilla v. Kentucky, 12 NEV. L.J. 364, 368–69 (2012) (explaining that the 
Court’s concern for the untrained layperson’s ability to understand legal proceedings also 
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Without access to trained counsel, the criminal process was 
thought to lack fundamental fairness.92  Indeed, a statute passed by 
the General Assembly for the colony of Rhode Island in 1660 
affording defendants a right to counsel recognized the obstacles 
facing lay defendants.93  These individuals, the statute’s prefatory 
language explained, “may not bee accomplished with soe much 
wisome and knowlidge of the law as to plead [their] own inocencye, 
&c. [sic].”94  Ultimately, investigation allows the defense attorney to 
determine whether the defendant’s goals are flights of fancy or legal 
possibilities.95  Only then can the attorney advise the client about 
suitable strategies to accomplish the defendant’s goals.96 
Despite the centrality of investigation to the right to counsel, the 
Supreme Court has repeated many times over that no attorney is 
obligated to investigate endlessly.97  In a recent reprise of Strickland’s 
acknowledgment that the Sixth Amendment recognizes a reasonable 
limit on the duty to investigate,98 the Court in Cullen v. Pinholster99 
explained that “[t]here comes a point where a defense attorney will 
reasonably decide that another strategy is in order, thus ‘mak[ing] 
particular investigations unnecessary.’”100  The question then becomes 
                                                        
appeared in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938), a right-to-counsel decision issued 
six years after Powell). 
 92.  See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 58, at 122 (discussing the importance of having an at-
torney for an appeal as a matter of right from a criminal conviction); Metzger, supra note 
56, at 1642 (explaining that the Powell Court’s articulation of the right to counsel as even-
ing the imbalance between the prosecution and the defense “echoed the colonists’ views 
about counsel”). 
 93.  TOMKOVICZ, supra note 58, at 11. 
 94.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 95.  See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 171 (1986) (determining that defense 
counsel acted within the bounds of professional conduct by refusing to go along with a 
client’s decision to perjure himself). 
 96.  See TOMKOVICZ, supra note 58, at 124 (noting that defense counsel must make 
“herself aware of all the apposite facts and law . . . to formulate arguments and positions, 
and to plan strategies”). 
 97.  See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1406–07 (2011) (“Strickland itself re-
jected the notion that the same investigation will be required in every case.”). 
 98.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (explaining that counsel 
has a duty to make “reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary”). 
 99.  131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). 
 100.  Id. at 1407 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). 
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what constitutes a reasonable decision to cease investigation.  It is 
clear that a “cursory investigation” is insufficient, even where, as in 
Wiggins v. Smith,101 counsel claims to have decided to focus their 
efforts on one aspect of a defense strategy over another.102  If, 
however, counsel elects to end the investigation based on “reasonable 
professional judgments,” then the choice is deemed a matter of 
defense strategy beyond the reach of courts to second-guess.103  In 
sum, the amount of deference given to an attorney’s decision to stop 
investigating largely depends on what the attorney learned prior to 
ending the investigation.104 
In the highly important plea context, given its dominance in 
contemporary criminal proceedings,105 a defense attorney is charged 
with equipping the defendant with the information needed to 
understand the consequences of pleading versus going to trial.106  
Specifically, the duty to investigate requires that the defense attorney 
do as much investigation as necessary to provide the defendant with 
an understanding of the proposed plea conditions and options.107  
                                                        
 101.  539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 102.  See id. at 527 (“In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney’s investigation, how-
ever, a court must consider . . . whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable at-
torney to investigate further.”).  In Wiggins, one of two defense attorneys claimed that de-
fense counsel decided to “disput[e] Wiggins’ direct responsibility for the murder” during 
the sentencing proceeding rather than present mitigation evidence of Wiggins’ troubled 
life.  Id. at 516–17. 
 103.  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 528 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91). 
 104.  See Stephen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 515, 531 
(2009) (noting that the Wiggins Court determined that if the defense attorneys “had seen 
how powerful the background evidence was, even they would have introduced it”). 
 105.  See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 
1909, 1912 (1992) (writing that plea bargaining “is not some adjunct to the criminal jus-
tice system[, but instead] is the criminal justice system”). 
 106.  Jane Campbell Moriarty & Marisa Main, “Waiving” Goodbye to Rights: Plea Bargaining 
and the Defense Dilemma of Competent Representation, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1029, 1042–43 
(2011). 
 107.  See Beckham v. Wainwright, 639 F.2d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 1981) (“When a defendant 
pleads guilty on the advice of counsel, the attorney has the duty to advise the defendant of 
the available options and possible consequences.”); Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 
944, 949 (1st Cir. 1973) (“Particularly when a plea bargain is discussed . . . it is incumbent 
on counsel to acquaint himself or herself with all the available alternatives and their con-
sequences for the defendant’s liberty and rehabilitation.”); Moriarty & Main, supra note 
106, at 1043 (observing that in Padilla, the Supreme Court held that the defense attorney 
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Some circuits have concretized this as a requirement that the attorney 
give the defendant an “informed opinion” about how to plea, though 
no circuit requires that counsel recommend a particular plea.108  For 
its part, the Supreme Court recently explained that effective 
assistance of counsel involves providing accurate advice about plea 
negotiations.109  Thus, not providing advice, or providing inaccurate 
advice that leads to a worse outcome, whether by pleading to a worse 
offer or by conviction after trial, can serve as the basis of an ineffective 
assistance claim.110 
Because the right to counsel is not concerned with obtaining a 
favorable outcome for the defendant111—a goal that most defendants 
understandably think is paramount—it is not surprising that many 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail.112  Rather, courts correctly 
conclude that thorough investigation and corresponding advice satisfy 
the counsel guarantee.113  So too does thorough investigation followed 
                                                        
was ineffective for failing “to advise the defendant of possible deportation consequences of 
a guilty plea”).  In Hill v. Lockhart, the Supreme Court extended the Strickland standard for 
the ineffectiveness of counsel to the plea process.  474 U.S. 52, 57–58 (1985). 
 108.  Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 497 (2d Cir. 1996); see United States v. Leonti, 326 
F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is equally ineffective to fail to advise a client to enter 
into a plea bargain when it is clearly in the client’s best interest.”); Purdy v. United States, 
208 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding that failure to advise the defendant on whether 
to take a plea did not constitute ineffective assistance when counsel fully informed the de-
fendant of the strength of the government’s case).  The informed opinion requirement 
finds support in Von Moltke v. Gillies, where the Court stated: “Prior to trial an accused is 
entitled to rely upon his counsel to make an independent examination of the facts, cir-
cumstances, pleadings and laws involved and then to offer his informed opinion as to what 
plea should be entered.”  332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948). 
 109.  Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012). 
 110.  Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384–85 (2012) (determining that when ineffec-
tive advice leads a criminal defendant to reject, not accept, a plea offer, “a defendant must 
show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the 
plea offer would have been presented to the court” to demonstrate Strickland prejudice). 
 111.  Cf. TOMOKVICZ, supra note 58, at 49 (“The core reason for the constitutional right 
to [counsel] is to ‘equalize’ the status of the criminal defendant in the battle with the 
state.”). 
 112.  See, e.g., VICTOR E. FLANGO, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 62 
tbl.17 (1994) (indicating that eight percent of state court habeas petitions based on inef-
fective assistance claims and less than one percent of such federal claims were successful). 
 113.  See supra notes 80–110 and accompanying text. 
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by an incorrect prediction of how certain facts will be perceived by a 
court or jury, or how a court or jury will decide regarding guilt.114 
A mistaken prediction about a factual or legal issue’s effect, 
however, is different from incorrect advice based on an attorney’s 
unreasonable unawareness of that issue.  Ending investigation 
because an attorney has incorrectly identified the state of applicable 
law, for example, is wholly distinct from identifying that legal 
principle correctly, but mistakenly predicting how a court would 
interpret it.115  In the first instance, an attorney failed to perform her 
function as a legal expert, and in the second, the attorney performed 
that function and exercised her judgment in a reasonable manner.  A 
similarly troubling issue arises when counsel allegedly cuts off 
investigation of relevant facts or law due to “inattention;” in such 
instances the duty to investigate is likewise violated.116  If, by contrast, 
the attorney decided to cease investigation as a result of “reasoned 
strategic judgment,” then there is no deficiency in the duty to 
investigate.117 
A.  Investigating Facts 
Although many ineffective assistance of counsel claims are 
unsuccessful, Supreme Court decisions are filled with examples of 
attorneys who failed to conduct sufficient investigation of pertinent 
                                                        
 114.  See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1390–91 (acknowledging that failure to predict the outcome 
of a trial is not automatically deemed ineffective assistance of counsel); McMann v. Rich-
ardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970) (explaining that judicial refusal to accept a plea does not 
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel if the plea was made under “reasonably compe-
tent advice”); see also Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 143 (Iowa 2001) (“Miscalculated 
trial strategies and mere mistakes in judgment normally do not rise to the level of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel.”). 
 115.  WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.10(c) (3d ed. 2000).  Compare 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395–96 (2000) (stating that the failure to investigate rec-
ords from the defendant’s “nightmarish childhood” was based on a misunderstanding 
“that state law barred access to such records” and that defense counsel “did not fulfill their 
obligation to conduct a thorough investigation”), with McMann, 397 U.S. at 770 (explain-
ing that “the good-faith evaluations of a reasonably competent attorney [may] turn out to 
be mistaken either as to the facts or as to what a court’s judgment might be on given 
facts”). 
 116.  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523–29 (2003). 
 117.  Id. 
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facts to allow for a reasonable decision to stop investigating.118  In 
Rompilla v. Beard,119 for example, the Court concluded that defense 
counsel were constitutionally deficient for failing to examine the 
court file on the defendant’s prior conviction.120  Any reasonably 
competent attorney, the Court held, would have consulted this 
information, though voluminous, because it was clear from the nature 
of the charged offense of murder and the prosecution’s announced 
intent to seek the death penalty that the prosecution would probably 
rely on information of prior convictions in the sentencing phase as 
the evidence of aggravation necessary to obtain a death sentence.121  
According to the Supreme Court, knowing this information, 
reasonably competent counsel would have tried to learn what they 
could about Rompilla’s prior convictions so as to become familiar 
with the strength of the prosecution’s aggravation claim and to 
identify potential sentencing mitigation evidence.122  Similarly, in 
Porter v. McCollum,123 the Court reiterated defense counsel’s obligation 
“to conduct some sort of mitigation investigation”—specifically into 
the factual matters of the defendant’s mental health, family history, 
and military service.124  The Court found that the failure to conduct 
such an investigation, rendered the representation Porter received 
constitutionally deficient.125 
                                                        
 118.  Though many of these cases arose from capital sentencing proceedings, the Court 
applied Strickland to a non-capital sentencing claim and numerous courts of appeal have 
done the same.  See infra Part II.B.1; see also Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at 
Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1069, 1080–81 (2009) (explaining that the two-prong test for 
capital sentencing applied in Strickland has been applied to non-capital sentencing by the 
Supreme Court and most of the lower federal courts). 
 119.  545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
 120.  Id. at 383. 
 121.  Id. at 377–78, 383.  Pennsylvania law in effect at the time of Rompilla’s trial re-
quired evidence of aggravation to issue a death sentence.  42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(c)(2) 
(2007).  Among the statutorily permissible aggravating circumstances was evidence that 
“[t]he defendant had a history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence 
to a person.”  Id. § 9711(d)(9). 
 122.  See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 385 (“[I]t is difficult to see how counsel could have failed 
to realize that without examining the readily available file they were seriously compromis-
ing their opportunity to respond to a case for aggravation.”). 
 123.  558 U.S. 30, 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009). 
 124.  Id. at 453. 
 125.  Id. 
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Following a similar vein, in Kimmelman v. Morrison126 the Supreme 
Court concluded that a defense attorney who did not conduct any 
pretrial discovery, and therefore was unaware of the importance of 
moving to suppress key evidence, “fell below the level of reasonable 
professional assistance” required by Strickland.127  The Court explained 
that “a total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery” was “unreasonable, 
that is, contrary to prevailing professional norms” because the 
decision “was not based on ‘strategy,’ but on counsel’s mistaken 
beliefs that the State was obliged to take the initiative and turn over 
all of its inculpatory evidence to the defense.”128  Without discovery, 
the Court explained, defense counsel could neither investigate nor 
reach a reasonable decision not to investigate.129 
Even where counsel conducts some investigation into mitigating 
circumstances, it may not be enough to satisfy the Sixth Amendment 
duty.  In Wiggins, for example, the Supreme Court determined that 
counsel fell short of providing reasonably competent assistance where 
they did not pursue leads about possible mitigation evidence that 
were apparent from the investigation they performed.130  In particular, 
the Court stated that the evidence of Wiggins’s troubled life that his 
defense attorneys uncovered should have informed them of the need 
                                                        
 126.  477 U.S. 365 (1986). 
 127.  Id. at 385–86. 
 128.  Id.  Though the Court does not explain why Morrison’s attorney was deficient, it 
was likely because, pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny, the 
defense attorney should have submitted a request for exculpatory evidence tailored to the 
defense strategy rather than rely on the prosecutor’s much more lax obligation to affirma-
tively turn over evidence that is obviously of substantial value to the defense. Cf. id. at 84, 
87 (“hold[ing] that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an ac-
cused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment”); see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) (explaining that 
when “evidence is obviously of such substantial value to the defense . . . elementary fairness 
requires it to be disclosed even without a specific request”); Michael A. Collora & William 
A. Haddad, Exculpatory Evidence: Getting It and Using It, CHAMPION, Mar. 2010, at 16–17 
(suggesting best defense practices for obtaining exculpatory information).  In Kimmelman, 
the defense attorney failed to learn that the police confiscated a bedsheet from the de-
fendant’s home without a warrant or an applicable exception because he did not request 
any discovery.  477 U.S. at 368–69, 385. 
 129.  Id. at 385. 
 130.  See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524–25 (2003) (“[C]ounsel uncovered no evi-
dence in their investigation to suggest that a mitigation case . . . would have been counter-
productive, or that further investigation would have been fruitless . . . .”). 
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to investigate his background further to allow for an “informed 
choice” about how to proceed with the defense.131 
Following this theme, in Williams v. Taylor132 the Court found 
deficient performance where sentencing-phase counsel “failed to 
conduct an investigation that would have uncovered extensive records 
graphically describing Williams’ nightmarish childhood” that could 
have bolstered a mitigation argument.133  Even though Williams’s 
sentencing-stage attorney presented some mitigation evidence—
testimony provided by Williams’s mother, two neighbors, and a 
psychiatrist, plus repeated references to Williams’s confession—the 
Court nonetheless concluded that counsel’s failure to explore and 
present the background history denied Williams effective assistance 
because the mitigation investigation was shortened by attorney error, 
rather than by reasoned decision making.134  As the Court explained, 
defense counsel failed to investigate Williams’ troubled childhood 
“not because of any strategic calculation but because they incorrectly 
thought that state law barred access to such records.”135  The Court 
then stated that investigation cut short due to the attorney’s mistaken 
understanding of state law is not characteristic of an attorney who has 
“fulfill[ed her] obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the 
defendant’s background.”136  Instead, it is the “unprofessional service” 
targeted by Strickland’s deficiency prong.137 
Lower state and federal courts have followed similar paths.  The 
Supreme Court of Utah in State v. Holland,138 for example, found 
ineffective assistance of counsel where the record suggested that the 
defense attorney might not have done any factual investigation.  The 
record, the court explained, was unclear about whether the defense 
attorney had “analyzed the law and the facts and laid out the options” 
                                                        
 131.  Id.; see also Porter v. McCollum, 553 U.S. 30, 130 S. Ct. 447, 453 (2009) (comparing 
the case to Wiggins and observing that defense counsel should have conducted an investi-
gation based on information about the defendant’s background revealed in court-ordered 
competency evaluations). 
 132.  529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
 133.  Id. at 395, 398–99; see also supra note 115. 
 134.  Id. at 369, 395–96. 
 135.  Id. at 395. 
 136.  Id. at 396. 
 137.  See id. (acknowledging that defense counsel did not fulfill their obligations to Wil-
liams and then determining whether that “unprofessional service prejudiced Williams 
within the meaning of Strickland”). 
 138.  921 P.2d 430 (Utah 1996). 
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for the defendant prior to pleading, or whether the attorney 
encouraged the defendant to plead guilty “on the basis of his own 
judgment that [the defendant] was guilty.”139  Meanwhile, in Linstadt 
v. Keane140 the Second Circuit concluded that an attorney’s 
representation was deficient in part because he failed to do enough 
factual investigation to realize a discrepancy in a key date.141 
These cases suggest an unmistakable and profoundly common-
sense trend: Defense attorneys must conduct a reasonably thorough 
investigation of the facts regarding a client’s predicament.  This 
reasonableness threshold varies from case to case, but it always 
prohibits decision-making based on uninformed assumptions or 
incorrect beliefs about what facts the law allowed them to access.  As 
this Article argues, Padilla, in contrast, waters down the duty to 
investigate such that poorly informed counseling may be 
constitutionally permissible in the context of the immigration 
consequences of conviction.142 
B.  Investigating Law 
Ineffective assistance can also result from constitutionally 
inadequate investigation of relevant legal issues.143  An attorney who 
fails to become familiar with the relevant law, numerous court 
decisions have concluded, cannot properly advise a defendant about 
the wisdom of entering a guilty plea.144  For example, in United States v. 
Cavitt,145 a decision that epitomizes this jurisprudential theme, the 
Fifth Circuit explained that “[t]he lawyer must ‘actually and 
substantially assist his client in deciding whether to plead guilty.’”146  
The court went on to state: “‘It is [the attorney’s] job to provide the 
accused an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.  The 
                                                        
 139.  Id. at 436.  
 140.  239 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 141.  See id. at 198–204 (“An effective lawyer who worked out the chronology of the 
events could have argued convincingly that the child’s errors evidence manipulative coach-
ing by an adult.”).  
 142.  See infra Part III. 
 143.  See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 144.  See, e.g., United States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 440–41 (5th Cir. 2008) (examining 
the extent of defense counsel’s familiarity with the relevant law to determine whether the 
attorney’s performance with respect to the plea advice was deficient). 
 145.  550 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 146.  Id. at 440 (quoting Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1974)). 
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advice he gives need not be perfect, but it must be reasonably 
competent.  His advice should permit the accused to make an 
informed and conscious choice.’”147 
No matter the specific aspect of criminal law involved, these 
judicial decisions clearly announce courts’ sentiments that an attorney 
who does not understand the relevant law cannot help the defendant 
make an informed and conscious choice about how best to proceed.  
Though courts have come to this conclusion about a range of 
substantive areas of law,148 two are particularly relevant to an 
understanding of how Padilla alters the duty to investigate: sentencing 
law and immigration law provisions that bear directly on criminal 
liability or punishment in criminal courts. 
1.  Understanding Sentencing Law 
The effective-assistance-of-counsel requirements pertaining to 
sentencing law are especially instructive for two reasons.  First, the 
Padilla majority’s characterization of deportation as part of the 
punishment meted out upon conviction suggests that it considers 
deportation to be a feature of sentencing.  A majority of the Padilla 
Court clearly viewed deportation as a “penalty” that arises from a 
criminal conviction.149  Importantly, the majority described 
deportation as “an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most 
important part—of the penalty that may be imposed” upon 
conviction.150  This is no minor statement, since imprisonment and 
fines, both of which are routine consequences of conviction, are 
undeniably weighty considerations. 
Second, sentencing law is particularly relevant because it 
dovetails remarkably complex legal analysis about the effect of 
criminal liability with the need for an attorney to exercise predictive 
judgment about how that law will be applied.  By melding 
complicated legal analysis with an attorney’s informed predictions, 
sentencing law tracks the analysis of immigration law and penal 
statutes that determine the immigration law consequences of 
conviction at the heart of the Padilla Court’s concern.  Importantly, 
federal and state courts have held that predictive judgments do not 
                                                        
 147.  Id. (quoting Herring, 491 F.2d at 128). 
 148.  See, e.g., id. at 435–41 (addressing ineffectiveness of counsel and the duty to inves-
tigate the relevant law in the context of a Fourth Amendment claim). 
 149.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 256, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481–82 (2010). 
 150.  Id. at 1480 (footnote omitted). 
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render assistance of counsel ineffective if they turn out to have been 
incorrect, as long as they were reasonable.151  In contrast, courts have 
consistently deemed defense attorneys’ errors about the applicable 
substantive sentencing law—rather than errors in the predictions 
made based on the law—to fall below the standard of professional 
competence set out in Strickland. 
Numerous courts have taken issue with defense attorneys who 
poorly understood sentencing law and, as a result, advised clients that 
they were exposed to less severe sentences than turned out to be true, 
a situation comparable to the defense attorney who incorrectly advises 
that deportation will not result from conviction.  The Sixth Circuit, 
for example, in Magana v. Hofbauer152 determined that an attorney 
who informed a defendant that he faced “at most, a ten-year sentence 
were he to be convicted at trial” provided constitutionally deficient 
advice because, unknown to the attorney, a state statute required that 
the sentences from multiple convictions run consecutively.153  The 
court observed that the attorney was “complete[ly] ignoran[t] of the 
relevant law under which his client was charged,”154 which rendered 
the assistance of counsel constitutionally “inadequate.”155  Likewise, 
the First Circuit in Correale v. United States156 announced that defense 
counsel “must know or learn about the relevant law and evaluate its 
                                                        
 151.  See, e.g., Beckham v. Wainwright, 639 F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Nor is an er-
roneous estimate by counsel as to the length of sentence necessarily indicative of ineffec-
tive assistance.” (citing Johnson v. Massey, 516 F.2d 1001, 1002 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curi-
am)); Johnson, 516 F.2d at 1002 (denying a voluntariness challenge to a plea premised on 
the defense attorney’s “good faith but erroneous prediction of [the] sentence”); Masciola 
v. United States, 469 F.2d 1057, 1059 (3d Cir. 1972) (concluding that if counsels’ assur-
ances were nothing “more than predictions based on [their] knowledge and experience,” 
then, even if inaccurate, the assurance did not render the plea involuntary); Perna v. Unit-
ed States, 975 F. Supp. 657, 670–72 (D.N.J. 1997) (denying ineffective assistance relief 
where the defense attorney informed the defendant that he would request a twenty-year 
sentence, but the defendant was aware that the government would seek twenty-five years, 
and the court followed the government’s suggestion). 
 152.  263 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 153.  Id. at 545–50. 
 154.  Id. at 550. 
 155.  Id. at 549–50; see also Finch v. Vaughn, 67 F.3d 909, 916–17 (11th Cir. 1995) (de-
termining that an attorney provided ineffective assistance where he advised a defendant in 
a state criminal proceeding that his state conviction and a federal conviction would run 
concurrently). 
 156.  479 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1973). 
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application to his or her client.”157  The court stated that failure to do 
so “amount[s] to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.”158  
The court further explained that counsel’s failure to learn about an 
important sentencing statute that prohibited the sentence issued (and 
resulted in a longer sentence) was “inexcusable.”159 
This sentiment also appears in the Iowa Supreme Court’s 
conclusion in State v. Kress160 that a defense attorney’s failure to 
correct the trial court’s misstatement about the maximum possible 
punishment “placed counsel below the range of normal 
competency.”161  The attorney’s failure, the court explained, “‘does 
not involve trial tactics, strategies, or other judgment calls that we do 
not ordinarily second-guess. . . . Rather, it concerns counsel’s legal 
misadvice resulting from his unfamiliarity with and failure to research 
applicable statutory provisions . . . .’”162  Constitutionally adequate 
counsel would have corrected the trial court’s erroneous statement 
that it had the power to waive the mandatory minimum sentence, thus 
giving the defendant an accurate understanding of the consequences 
of pleading.163 
Two circuits have specifically addressed situations in which the 
defendant received inaccurate advice that he would become eligible 
for parole or probation sooner than was actually true.  In Garmon v. 
                                                        
 157.  Id. at 949; see also Straw v. United States, 931 F. Supp. 49, 51–52 (D. Mass. 1996) 
(applying the Correale principle in a prosecution for illegal re-entry to the United States, 
which resulted in a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement for having been convicted of an 
aggravated felony).  The Seventh Circuit has similarly noted that “erroneous advice [re-
garding the likely sentences that] stem[med] from the failure to review the statute or case 
law that the attorney knew to be relevant” was deficient performance.  Moore v. Bryant, 
348 F.3d 238, 242 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 158.  Correale, 479 F.2d at 949. 
 159.  Id. at 948–49.  The court ultimately decided the case on another issue.  Id. at 946–
47, 950. 
 160.  636 N.W.2d 12, 22 (Iowa 2001). 
 161.  Id. at 21–22. 
 162.  Id. (quoting Meier v. State, 337 N.W.2d 204, 206–07 (Iowa 1983)). 
 163.  Id. at 19 (agreeing with the defendant that “her counsel’s failures were [constitu-
tionally deficient] because they resulted in a plea that was neither knowing nor volun-
tary”).  At the plea hearing, the judge told the defendant that she would be required to 
serve “one-third of the maximum indeterminate sentence . . . unless the sentencing court 
waived the one-third requirement.”  Id. at 16.  The sentencing court, however, lacked the 
authority to waive this requirement.  Id. at 18–19. 
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Lockhart,164 the Eighth Circuit granted an ineffective assistance claim 
where a defendant “impressed on his trial counsel the importance of 
parole eligibility to his decision to plead guilty,” yet the defense 
attorney erroneously told the defendant that he would become 
eligible for parole in five years instead of fifteen years.165  Had the 
attorney conducted even “[m]inimal research,” the court implied, the 
attorney would have realized the correct parole eligibility date.166  
Meanwhile, in Iaea v. Sunn167 the Ninth Circuit found that an 
attorney’s performance was deficient because she informed the 
defendant that there was a “good chance” he would receive probation 
upon pleading guilty and “that the chance of his getting an extended 
sentence was ‘almost zero.’”168  If the defendant went to trial, the 
attorney added, he faced a mandatory ten-year term of imprisonment 
under Hawaii’s minimum sentencing law.169  Upon pleading, the 
defendant was sentenced to life sentences on three counts, twenty-
year sentences on two counts, and one ten-year sentence.170  Defense 
counsel committed a “serious error” in advising the defendant about 
sentencing, the court explained.171  Specifically, the Eighth Circuit 
noted that such “gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome 
presented in this case, combined with the erroneous advice on the 
possible effects of going to trial, falls below the level of competence 
required of defense attorneys.”172 
The Seventh Circuit has found deficient performance when the 
opposite situation presented itself—when an attorney advised the 
defendant that he faced more jail time than was actually true, which is 
advice that is akin to incorrectly saying that deportation awaits.  In 
                                                        
 164.  938 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 165.  Id. at 120–22. 
 166.  Garmon, 938 F.2d at 121. 
 167.  800 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 168.  Id. at 863–65. 
 169.  See id. at 863, 864–65 & n.2 (explaining why the mandatory minimum sentencing 
guideline did not apply to the defendant in this case). 
 170.  Id. at 863. 
 171.  Id. at 864–65. 
 172.  Id. at 865.  But see Doganiere v. United States, 914 F.2d 165, 168 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(determining that advising a defendant that he faced a maximum term of imprisonment 
of twelve years only to receive a term of fifteen years “does not rise to the level of a gross 
mischaracterization of the likely outcome of his case, and thus does not constitute ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel”). 
 2013] STRICKLAND-LITE 873 
Moore v. Bryant,173 the court considered an ineffective assistance claim 
where the defense attorney told the defendant that if he pled guilty 
immediately he faced a ten-year sentence, but if he lost at trial he 
faced twenty-two to twenty-seven years imprisonment.174  In reality, the 
defendant faced ten years upon pleading, but twelve and one-half to 
fifteen years after being convicted at trial.175  The defense attorney, 
however, did not know this because he had failed to research the 
applicable statute and case law.176  The Seventh Circuit reasoned: 
[M]isinformation provided by an attorney on an issue that is 
certainly critical to the plea decision—the length of the 
sentence that the defendant faces—and that . . . is the result 
of the attorney’s failure to examine the statute and the law 
that the attorney himself identified as relevant may be 
considered objectively unreasonable.177 
Some courts have allowed ineffective assistance claims to proceed 
where counsel failed to understand a recidivist enhancement 
provision.  The D.C. Circuit in United States v. McCoy178 explained that 
“‘familiarity with the structure and basic content of the [Sentencing] 
Guidelines (including the definition and implications of career 
offender status) has become a necessity for counsel who seek to give 
effective representation.’”179  The court observed that where the 
defense attorney “failed to follow the formula specified on the face of 
the Guidelines,” as occurred in McCoy, the defendant received 
constitutionally deficient representation.180  Similarly, in Ey v. State181 
                                                        
 173.  348 F.3d 238 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 174.  Id. at 240–41. 
 175.  Id. at 242. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id.  As the Seventh Circuit explained in another case, “a reasonably competent 
lawyer will attempt to learn all of the relevant facts of the case, make an estimate of a likely 
sentence, and communicate the results of that analysis to the client before allowing the 
client to plead guilty.”  Bethel v. United States, 458 F.3d 711, 717 (7th Cir. 2006).  In Bethel, 
the court found that the record was insufficiently developed to determine whether the de-
fense attorney met this standard.  Id. at 717–718.  Instead, the court disposed of the inef-
fective assistance claim by deciding that the defendant had not been prejudiced.  Id. at 
718–19. 
 178.  215 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 179.  Id. at 108 (quoting United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
 180.  Id.  The issue of recidivism arose in McCoy because the defendant had two previous 
drug felony convictions.  Id. at 104.  Pleading guilty to a third offense made him a “career 
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the Supreme Court of Florida found ineffective assistance where the 
defense attorney failed to accurately research the state’s habitual 
offender statute, resulting in incorrect advice about the sentencing 
impact of one proceeding on another.182  The court was not swayed by 
the fact that the prosecution of the second case had not yet begun at 
the time that the attorney provided this advice.183  Rather, the 
supreme court stressed that the “potential for sentence enhancement 
[wa]s real.”184  Telling the defendant that a conviction in the first case 
would not affect a sentence in the second case was therefore 
constitutionally deficient representation.185 
Also addressing a recidivist offender statute, but in a case 
involving the opposite advice, the Supreme Court of South Carolina 
in Berry v. State186 granted an ineffective assistance claim where the 
defense attorney did not inform the defendant that a prior offense 
could not serve as a sentencing enhancement and, when the state 
successfully sought enhancement based on this conviction, the 
attorney did not object.187  The court explained that “the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel requires that 
                                                        
offender” and increased his base offense level, which meant that the crime he was charged 
with committing carried a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.  Id. at 105.  The de-
fense attorney and prosecutor both told the defendant that, pursuant to the Sentencing 
Guidelines, if he pleaded guilty he would be sentenced to between 188 and 235 months 
after accounting for a reduction for accepting responsibility.  Id.  Instead, the correct sen-
tencing range was 262 to 327 months.  Id. 
 181.  982 So. 2d 618, 623 (Fla. 2008). 
 182.  Id. at 620, 623. 
 183.  See id. at 620 (noting that the defendant “both committed and informed his coun-
sel about the second crime before he pleaded guilty to the first one,” but had not yet been 
arrested for the second crime at that point, and that the defendant later filed a pro se mo-
tion attacking his conviction in the second case). 
 184.  Id. at 623.  In focusing on the fact that the second offense had already been com-
mitted at the time the attorney provided the faulty advice and the fact that the attorney 
was aware of the second offense, the court distinguished its earlier holding that incorrectly 
advising a defendant about the sentencing impact of one offense on an uncommitted, and 
therefore “hypothetical” second offense, was not ineffective assistance.  Id. at 621–23 (dis-
cussing State v. Dickey, 928 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 2006)).  The court also distinguished Ey from 
instances where the attorney did not advise about the impact “of a guilty plea on a sen-
tence for a future crime.”  Id. at 621 (discussing Major v. State, 814 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2002)). 
 185.  Id. at 625. 
 186.  675 S.E.2d 425 (S.C. 2009). 
 187.  Id. at 426–27. 
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counsel accurately inform a defendant, to the extent possible, of the 
qualifying nature of a prior offense for enhancement purposes.”188  In 
this case, the court added, counsel should have informed the 
defendant that there was a sound argument to be made that the prior 
offense could not be used for sentencing enhancement because, until 
Berry, the court had not decided the issue.189  Where an argument 
exists that a prior conviction cannot be used to augment a sentence, 
in other words, defense counsel’s failure to consider raising such a 
challenge constitutes deficient representation.190 
Continuing the disapproval of advice based on incorrect legal 
analyses, at least two circuits and the Supreme Court have found an 
attorney’s performance constitutionally inadequate where incorrect 
advice led the defendant to reject the plea and suffer a worse fate at 
trial.  The Fifth Circuit in Beckham v. Wainwright191 held that an 
attorney’s advice was deficient where the attorney incorrectly and 
upon “no basis” assured the defendant that he faced a five-year 
sentence whether he pleaded guilty or, as actually occurred, withdrew 
the plea and went to trial.192  After withdrawing a guilty plea and being 
convicted at trial, the defendant was sentenced to fifty years 
imprisonment.193  Likewise, in United States v. Gaviria194 the D.C. 
Circuit found deficient performance where the defense attorney 
failed to account for a precedential decision altering the career 
offender enhancement.195  As a result of the misinformation he then 
received from counsel, the defendant turned down the plea offer that 
                                                        
 188.  Id. at 427. 
 189.  See id. (noting that defense counsel never told the defendant about “the potential 
challenge to the use of the drug paraphernalia conviction for enhancement” and finding 
that “counsel’s failure to even consider [the issue] fell below the standard of objective rea-
sonableness”).  
 190.  Id.  In another case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina determined that an at-
torney was deficient in failing to tell the defendant that a crime was a felony rather than a 
misdemeanor—a distinction with an obvious sentencing effect.  Jackson v. State, 535 
S.E.2d 926, 927 (S.C. 2000). 
 191.  639 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 192.  Id. at 263, 267. 
 193.  Id. at 263–64. 
 194.  116 F.3d 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 195.  See id. at 1512 (stating that defense counsel should have been aware of the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Price, 990 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1993), which held that 
“a defendant convicted of conspiracy could not be sentenced as a career offender”). 
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would have resulted in a fifteen- to twenty-two-year prison term.196  
Instead, after a trial conviction, the defendant was sentenced to 
mandatory life imprisonment.197  More recently, the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided Lafler v. Cooper,198 a case in which the defense attorney, 
based on an incorrect understanding of the state law pertaining to 
murder, advised the defendant to reject a favorable plea offer.199  The 
defendant followed his attorney’s advice only to receive a much 
harsher sentence after trial than had been offered during plea 
negotiations.200  The parties conceded that this conduct constituted 
deficient performance, so the Court had no occasion to decide this 
issue itself, unlike the Fifth Circuit in Beckham.201  The Court did, 
however, go on to conclude that this deficient performance 
prejudiced the defendant precisely because he received a much 
harsher sentence than he could have pleaded to.202 
In some instances, courts have even concluded that a defense 
attorney’s failure to inform the defendant of a favorable plea offer 
can be deficient performance.  Recently, in Missouri v. Frye203 the 
Supreme Court held that “defense counsel has the duty to 
communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on 
terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.”204  
Similarly, twenty years earlier, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
considered Williams v. State205 in which the defense attorney failed to 
inform the defendant that the prosecutor was willing to accept a plea 
with a ten-year prison term instead of the mandatory twenty-five year 
term that the defendant faced by going to trial.206  The court stated 
that a reasonably competent attorney cannot “provide[] the 
                                                        
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id.  
 198.  132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 199.  Id. at 1383, 1386–87. 
 200.  Id. at 1383. 
 201.  Id. at 1386, 1391; see supra notes 191–193 and accompanying text. 
 202.  Id. at 1391.  Strickland’s prejudice prong is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 203.  132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012). 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Williams v. State, 326 Md. 367, 605 A.2d 103 (1992). 
 206.  Id. at 379, 605 A.2d at 109. 
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defendant with incomplete or misleading information with regard to 
the [plea] offer.”207 
Legal advice based on significant misunderstandings of 
applicable sentencing law is constitutionally problematic because it 
deprives the defendant of the skilled counsel contemplated by the 
Sixth Amendment.  As the Tenth Circuit explained in United States v. 
Washington,208 “fail[ure] to understand the basic structure and 
mechanics of the sentencing guidelines” constitutes deficient 
assistance of counsel because it renders the defense attorney 
“incapable of helping the defendant to make reasonably informed 
decisions throughout the criminal process.”209  In that case, the court 
added, the defendant was denied reasonably competent 
representation because he was not informed about the impact of 
relevant conduct on sentencing.210  The defense attorney failed to 
provide this information, not for any strategic reason but “because 
[he] did not understand [the relevant conduct’s] significance in the 
sentencing scheme.”211 
                                                        
 207.  Id. at 378, 605 A.2d at 108.  Though the Supreme Court recently held in Frye that a 
defense attorney must inform the defendant of a favorable plea offer, unlike the Maryland 
Court of Appeals in Williams, the Court did not frame this holding as a question concern-
ing the attorney’s duty to provide the defendant with accurate or complete information.  
Instead, Frye held that defense counsel has a duty to inform his client about favorable plea 
offers.  132 S. Ct. at 1408. 
 208.  619 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 209.  Id. at 1260. 
 210.  Id. at 1259, 1262; see also id. at 1254 (acknowledging that “the district court consid-
ered as relevant conduct [a] confidential informant’s statements and [a] probation office’s 
report regarding [the defendant’s] drug distribution activities between 1990–91”). 
 211.  Id. at 1259.  The Washington court distinguished an older Tenth Circuit decision in 
which the court determined that “[a] miscalculation or erroneous sentence estimation by 
defense counsel is not a constitutionally deficient performance rising to the level of inef-
fective assistance of counsel.”  United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1570 (10th Cir. 1993).  
Gordon, the Tenth Circuit explained in Washington, is limited to situations in which counsel 
miscalculated the sentencing impact of relevant conduct.  Washington, 619 F.3d at 1258–59.  
Specifically, the Washington court pointed out that Gordon’s attorney “advised him regard-
ing relevant conduct, but had [mistakenly] predicted that the court would not add to his 
sentence for such conduct.”  Id. at 1258 (discussing Gordon, 4 F.3d at 1569).  Gordon’s al-
lowance of misinformation, Washington decided, is distinct from the situation in Washington 
in which the defense counsel “never in any way informed [the defendant] about the ap-
plicability or impact of relevant conduct.”  Washington, 619 F.3d at 1259.  
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Collectively, these cases demonstrate courts’ repeated insistence 
that attorneys become sufficiently familiar with the sentencing law 
that will affect their clients’ future.  Attorneys are not required to 
become clairvoyants who can predict what judges or juries will do.212  
They must, however, “provide the accused an understanding of the 
law in relation to the facts” such that the defendant can “make an 
informed and conscious choice” about how to proceed.213 
Much as in the sentencing law context, the fate of noncitizen 
criminal defendants often lies in a complicated mix of statutes and 
case law.214  And much like sentencing law, sometimes the 
immigration law provisions that become highly relevant upon 
entering the criminal justice system bear good news for defendants—
avoiding removal—just as they sometimes bear bad news—the 
possibility of removal.  For the criminal defendant, the goal is always 
the same—receive the defense attorney’s assistance navigating the 
relevant law to reach an informed decision.  Padilla promised to 
constitutionalize this duty with regard to immigration consequences 
just as these cases illustrate has long been true with regard to 
sentencing consequences.  Part III explains how that promise 
continues to remain unfulfilled. 
2.  Understanding Immigration Law 
Despite some pre-Padilla perception that immigration law has no 
formal role to play in criminal law,215 immigration law, like sentencing 
law, has long been part of the substantive purview of criminal 
proceedings.  While it is true that most immigration consequences of 
conviction arise in separate administrative proceedings, two 
immigration consequences were or are determined within the 
criminal proceeding itself—judicial recommendations against 
                                                        
 212.  See Cooks v. United States, 461 F.2d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1972) (stating that “counsel 
need not be a fortune teller” and that “counsel’s inability to foresee future pronounce-
ments . . . does not render counsel’s representation ineffective”). 
 213.  United States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 440 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Herring v. Es-
telle, 491 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1974)). 
 214.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 215.  See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1487–88 (2010) (Alito, 
J., concurring) (“Criminal defense attorneys have expertise regarding the conduct of crim-
inal proceedings.  They are not expected to possess—and very often do not possess—
expertise in other areas of the law, and it is unrealistic to expect them to provide expert 
advice on matters that lie outside their area of training and experience.”); id. at 1488 
(“[M]any criminal defense attorneys have little understanding of immigration law . . . .”). 
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deportation (“JRAD”)216 and immigration questions that form an 
element of the substantive crime.217  Long before Padilla, some courts 
considered knowledge and advice about the immigration law 
provisions governing these concerns to be the responsibility of the 
constitutionally competent criminal defense attorney.218 
Numerous courts have granted ineffective assistance claims 
where defense attorneys failed to inform themselves and, by 
extension, their clients, of the possibility of obtaining a JRAD, a now-
repealed form of relief from removal that featured prominently in the 
Padilla decision.219  A judge’s decision to issue a JRAD, as Padilla 
explained, “had the effect of binding the Executive to prevent 
deportation.”220  An attorney’s failure to identify the possibility of 
obtaining a JRAD, therefore, was akin to failing to learn that the 
defendant was not eligible for a particular punishment and failing to 
object to that punishment’s prescription.221  Indeed, the Second 
Circuit, in Janvier v. United States,222 a decision cited by Padilla, 
concluded that a JRAD “is part of the sentencing process, a critical 
stage of the prosecution to which the Sixth Amendment safeguards 
are applicable.”223  The end result was that criminal defense attorneys 
                                                        
 216.  See Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1986) (determining that 
JRAD is part of the sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution, not part of the subsequent 
deportation proceeding). 
 217.  David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. 
L. REV. 157, 158 (2012) (“Immigration cases now are not only the largest category of fed-
eral criminal prosecutions; they are a majority of federal criminal prosecutions.”). 
 218.  See, e.g., Ittah v. United States, 761 F. Supp. 157, 158 (D. Me. 1989) (“The failure to 
request a judicial recommendation against deportation or to advise his client of the possi-
bility of such relief was not a strategic choice in this case; it was inadequate representa-
tion.”). 
 219.  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1479–80. 
 220.  Id. at 1479. 
 221.  See United States v. Shaibu, 957 F.2d 662, 664 (9th Cir. 1992) (describing the 
JRAD as “analogous to the imposition of a binding penalty in sentencing”).  In Lyons v. 
Pearce (“Lyons I”), the Supreme Court of Oregon “[e]quat[ed] an attorney’s failure to re-
quest a recommendation against deportation from the court with failure to perfect an ap-
peal” because “[i]n one the defendant faces certain exile from his chosen country and in 
the other the defendant faces certain imprisonment or other imposed penalties.”  694 
P.2d 969, 978 (Or. 1985). 
 222.  793 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 223.  Id. at 455; United States v. Castro, 26 F.3d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 1994) (adopting the 
Janvier reasoning); see also Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1479–80 (describing the Janvier holding that 
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were required to research the possibility of obtaining a JRAD just as 
they were required to explore the possibility that a sentencing statute 
did not apply.224  Given this reality, a federal district court, on remand 
from the Second Circuit decision in Janvier, analogized to the failure 
to file a motion to suppress in Kimmelman and, following the Second 
Circuit’s approach, determined that an attorney’s failure to seek a 
JRAD was not a strategic choice because the attorney was not aware of 
the deportation consequence of conviction and “made no effort to 
determine if such consequence existed.”225 
Highlighting the importance of reasonable investigation of 
applicable law, in Ittah v. United States,226 the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Maine found inadequate, rather than strategic, 
representation provided by an attorney who “did not know of the 
deportation consequences of Petitioner’s conviction and . . . did not 
effectively research the law dealing with situations like that of 
Petitioner.”227  Yet another federal court, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts, in United States v. Khalaf,228 explained 
that an attorney provided ineffective assistance when he incorrectly 
led a defendant to believe (and enter a plea based on that erroneous 
advice) that a JRAD was available even though it was not.229  As the 
Khalaf court explained: “An attorney has a duty to research the 
applicable law and to advise his client in such a way as to allow him to 
                                                        
the “right to effective assistance of counsel applies to a JRAD request”).  But see Retamoza 
v. State, 874 P.2d 603, 607 (Idaho 1994) (identifying a division among courts holding that 
failure to advise about the possibility of JRAD relief could form the basis of an ineffective 
assistance claim and courts holding the opposite).  It merits noting that, according to Re-
tamoza, many courts that held the failure to advise about JRAD relief was not ineffective 
assistance did so “upon the rationale that counsel’s obligation to advise regarding the con-
sequences of a guilty plea or conviction encompasses only direct consequences, not collat-
eral consequences such as deportation.”  Id.  Padilla explicitly rejected this distinction.  130 
S. Ct. at 1482 (“The collateral versus direct distinction is . . . ill-suited to evaluating a Strick-
land claim . . . .”). 
 224.  See supra note 218 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.B.1. 
 225.  Janvier v. United States, 659 F. Supp. 827, 828 n.1, 829 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).  Accord-
ing to the court: “Such a failure to investigate the applicable law of a case cannot be con-
sidered adequate under prevailing norms of professional competency.”  Id. at 829. 
 226.  761 F. Supp. 157 (D. Me. 1989). 
 227.  Id. at 158. 
 228.  116 F. Supp. 2d 210 (D. Mass. 1999). 
 229.  Id. at 215. 
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make informed choices . . . .”230  Thus, counsel’s “failure to read the 
statute and articulate the proper meaning to Petitioner [was] 
unreasonable under prevailing professional norms” precisely because 
it led to a misinformed choice.231 
The Supreme Court of Oregon took a more nuanced approach 
in Lyons v. Pearce (Lyons I)232 and Lyons v. Pearce (Lyons II),233 a pair of 
cases, considered in tandem and issued the same day, that involved a 
single noncitizen.  In Lyons I, the court held that if conviction would 
subject the defendant to deportation, then counsel’s failure to 
request a JRAD was constitutionally inadequate representation.234  In 
Lyons II, however, the court noted that if “there was no possibility” 
that conviction would result in deportation, then counsel was under 
no obligation to request JRAD relief.235  The supreme court concluded 
that the defense attorney should have sought a JRAD upon entry of 
the second conviction for a “crime potentially involving moral 
turpitude”—that is, a conviction that might render the noncitizen 
deportable for having been “‘convicted of two crimes involving moral 
turpitude.’”236 
As these cases suggest, the importance of researching and 
advising about the possibility of JRAD eligibility became a feature of 
constitutionally adequate criminal defense practice in the mid- to late-
1980s.237  Indeed, a leading figure in “crimmigration”238 circles, Lory 
                                                        
 230.  Id. at 213. 
 231.  Id. at 215. 
 232.  694 P.2d 969 (Or. 1985). 
 233.  694 P.2d 978 (Or. 1985). 
 234.  Lyons I, 694 P.2d at 978. 
 235.  Lyons II, 694 P.2d at 980.  Lyons I and Lyons II are companion cases that both raised 
an ineffective assistance claim.  The court separately addressed the ineffective assistance 
claim arising from a conviction that rendered the noncitizen deportable and the claim 
arising from a conviction that did not result in deportability.  Lyons I, 694 P.2d at 971–72; 
Lyons II, 694 P.2d at 980. 
 236.  See Lyons I, 694 P.2d at 972 n.3 (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1982), under 
which the defendant was vulnerable to deportation). 
 237.  See id. at 978 (“Commentators have observed that the recommendation against 
deportation is a significant tool available to forestall deportation of which defense attor-
neys should be aware.” (citing Irving A. Appleman, The Recommendation Against Deportation, 
58 A.B.A. J. 1294 (1972)); David. B. Wexler & James O. Neet, Jr., The Alien Criminal Defend-
ant: An Examination of Immigration Law Principles for Criminal Law Practice, 2 IMMIGR. & 
NAT’LITY L. REV. 285 (1979)). 
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D. Rosenberg, then in private practice and later a member of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals, co-authored an article in 1988 that 
listed “defense counsel’s failure to advise about the availability of a 
judicial recommendation against deportation . . . and to seek one” as 
a basis for vacating a conviction due to ineffective assistance, and 
discussed a number of opinions supporting this proposition.239 
These decisions further demonstrate courts’ views that defense 
attorneys were required to dirty their hands with the intricacies of 
immigration law.  To accurately learn if a JRAD was available, an 
attorney would first have to determine whether the defendant was in 
fact a U.S. citizen (and thereby immune from removal) or, if not, the 
current status of the defendant’s immigration authorization.  Then 
the attorney would need to grasp how a conviction for the particular 
offense charged would impact the defendant’s immigration 
authorization—specifically, the attorney would need to determine if 
conviction rendered the defendant deportable or inadmissible.240  If 
conviction did not render the defendant deportable, then JRAD 
would be irrelevant.  Lastly, though no court seems to have relied on 
this requirement as the basis for an ineffective assistance claim, a 
defense attorney would need to address tactical considerations that 
depended in large part on the noncitizen defendant’s legal status and 
“the possible consequences of notifying the INS [Immigration and 
Naturalization Service] of his existence.”241  Each of these steps 
required investigation and analysis of factual and legal questions most 
aptly described as quintessential immigration law.  Yet, as with 
sentencing law, courts regularly required defense attorneys to become 
familiar with these areas. 
                                                        
 238.  See Sklansky, supra note 217, at 159 (“Immigration enforcement and criminal jus-
tice are now so thoroughly entangled it is impossible to say where one starts and the other 
leaves off; growing numbers of practitioners describe themselves as working in the merged 
field of ‘crimmigration.’”). 
 239.  Lory D. Rosenberg & Kenneth H. Stern, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: An Antidote 
for the Convicted Alien, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 529, 532, 536–37 (1988).  In 1995, Ms. 
Rosenberg was appointed to the Board of Immigration appeals, “the highest administrative 
body for interpreting and applying immigration laws.”  Biographies, EXEC. OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.vkblaw.com/attorney/biabio.htm 
(last updated Feb. 15, 2000). 
 240.  See DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW & CRIMES 775–
86 (2012) (discussing the aspects of a JRAD remedy). 
 241.  Id. at 785–86. 
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Another circumstance that has historically required defense 
attorneys to delve into immigration law niceties arises when 
immigration law provisions form part of the substantive crime.  In 
United States v. Juarez,242 a recent Fifth Circuit decision, the defendant 
was charged with the federal crimes of making a false claim of 
citizenship and illegal re-entry and pleaded guilty to both crimes.243  
The court considered whether an attorney provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to learn about an obscure provision of 
naturalization law through which a minor noncitizen can 
automatically become a U.S. citizen—a process called “derivative 
citizenship,” to which the defendant had an arguable claim.244  To 
qualify for derivative citizenship, several conditions had to be met, 
including that the individual “[began] to reside permanently in the United 
States while under the age of eighteen years.”245  The defense attorney in 
Juarez admitted to having never heard of derivative citizenship; 
needless to say, he did not investigate whether Juarez satisfied the 
eligibility criteria.246  The court concluded that the attorney “had a 
duty to independently research the law and investigate the facts 
surrounding [his client’s] case.”247  As such, the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that the attorney’s “failure to investigate was 
unreasonable.”248 
More interesting than the court’s determination that the 
attorney was obligated to investigate the law surrounding derivative 
citizenship is the fact that the relevant law was hard to find, 
potentially not applicable given the defendant’s background, and 
nebulous at best.  First, the relevant derivative citizenship provision 
was repealed in 2000, a full six years prior to entry of the defendant’s 
guilty pleas.249  Finding the law was, therefore, not a simple matter of 
                                                        
 242.  672 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 243.  Id. at 384. 
 244.  Id. at 384–86. 
 245.  8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(5) (1994) (emphasis added), repealed by Child Citizenship Act 
of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–395, § 103, 114 Stat 1631, 1632 (2000).  The other conditions for 
derivative citizenship included the naturalization of at least one parent that took place be-
fore the individual turned eighteen years old.  Id. § 1432(a)(1)–(4).   
 246.  Juarez, 672 F.3d at 386–87. 
 247.  Id. at 387. 
 248.  Id. at 388. 
 249.  Id. at 384, 386 n.2; see also supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
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picking up a current copy of the INA.250  Second, the defendant, as 
the defense attorney knew, had previously been deported and may 
have been under the impression that he was not a U.S. citizen, given 
that he pleaded guilty to lying about being a U.S. citizen251 on a 
firearms purchase form and to illegal reentry.252  Third, even if the 
attorney had known about derivative citizenship and realized its 
potential application in Juarez, there was little authority interpreting 
the sole contested eligibility criterion: the meaning of “reside 
permanently.”  No binding precedent exists in the Fifth Circuit where 
Juarez was convicted.253  Still, the court concluded that a reasonable 
investigation would have led the attorney to a “plausible” defense of 
derivative citizenship as articulated in one of the following sources: 
dicta from a Second Circuit decision,254 an unpublished Ninth Circuit 
decision,255 and a suggested interpretation in a leading immigration 
law treatise.256  From this, the court determined, the defense attorney 
could have devised a plausible claim that Juarez was in fact a U.S. 
citizen, which, if the theory prevailed, would have been an 
                                                        
 250.  Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8 U.S.C.). 
 251.  See 18 U.S.C. § 911 (2006) (“Whoever falsely and willfully represents himself to be 
a citizen of the United States shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
three years, or both.”). 
 252.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2006) (“[A]ny alien who—has been denied . . . deport-
ed . . . and thereafter . . . enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United 
States, . . . shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.”); 
see also Juarez, 672 F.3d at 384–85 (“[The defendant] claims he first learned the possibility 
of his derivative U.S. citizenship through his mother’s naturalization in August, 2007,” the 
year after he pleaded guilty). 
 253.  See Juarez, 672 F.3d at 387 (“No Fifth Circuit case law interpreted § 1432(a)(5)[, 
the ‘reside permanently’ provision,] at the time [the defendant] pled guilty and today we 
decline to interpret the statute.”). 
 254.  Id. at 387; see Ashton v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A] child’s bare 
subjective intent to stay in the United States is insufficient to establish that he resides here 
permanently . . . .  We believe that there must be some objective official manifestation of 
the child’s permanent residence . . . .”). 
 255.  See United States v. Diaz-Guerrero, 132 F. App’x 739, 740–41 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(“[T]he definitions of ‘permanent’ and ‘residence’ that accompany the . . . statute belie a 
requirement of legal residency.”). 
 256.  See Juarez, 672 F.3d at 387 (citing IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK: 
A COMPREHENSIVE OUTLINE AND REFERENCE TOOL (11th ed. 2008)). 
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impenetrable defense to the false claim to citizenship and illegal 
reentry prosecutions.257 
Whether focused on guilt for a substantive immigration-related 
crime or on JRAD relief from deportation, these court decisions 
illustrate that defense counsel who are poorly informed about 
immigration law provisions are not the constitutionally mandated 
advocates that the Sixth Amendment guarantees.  Errors derived from 
a “lack of diligence,” as one court explained, are wholly different from 
errors in exercises of judgment.258  To avoid improperly advising a 
defendant, attorneys have been expected to become knowledgeable 
about the applicable law and, importantly, to advise the defendant 
accordingly, even, as these cases illustrate, when immigration law 
makes all the difference to a defendant.259 
                                                        
 257.  Id. at 384, 387–88.  Perhaps the court was motivated to find relief out of sympathy 
that a United States citizen defendant had been deported and was now facing criminal 
punishment for having violated immigration laws to which, it turns out, he was not subject.  
But, as the Juarez court noted, Strickland commands reviewing courts to “make ‘every ef-
fort . . . to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.’”  Id. at 386 (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).  Heeding this dictate, the Juarez court concerned 
itself with the defense attorney’s unreasonable actions in failing to inquire into an absolute 
defense available to the defendant.  Id. at 386–88.  To comfortably challenge the court’s 
stated rationalization would be to do what might be impossible but is certainly beyond the 
scope of this Article—peel back the court’s words and pierce the judges’ minds. 
 258.  See United States v. Loughery, 908 F.2d 1014, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[A] defend-
ant is more likely to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the error 
he points to arises from counsel’s lack of diligence rather than the exercise of judg-
ment.”). 
 259.  See Juarez, 672 F.3d at 388 (stating that defense counsel had a duty to investigate 
the law and facts to help the defendant make an informed decision and that the failure to 
do so was unreasonable under the first prong of Strickland); see also State v. Doggett, 687 
N.W.2d 97, 102 (Iowa 2004) (“‘A normally competent attorney who undertakes to repre-
sent a criminal defendant should either be familiar with the basic provisions of the crimi-
nal code, or should make an effort to acquaint himself with those provisions which may be 
applicable to the criminal acts allegedly committed by his client.’” (quoting State v. Schoe-
lerman, 315 N.W.2d 67, 71–72 (Iowa 1982))).  Importantly, an attorney is not required to 
raise every argument that might prove helpful to the defendant.  See Busby v. Dretke, 359 
F.3d 708, 716 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a reasonable attorney could have elected to 
bring a claim “despite its low likelihood of success,” but that it was not deficient for the 
attorney to elect not to bring such a claim). 
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Although JRADs were repealed in 1990,260 criminal defense 
attorneys in federal and state courtrooms across the country continue 
to grapple with other immigration law provisions.  Possession of a 
firearm by a person without authority to be in the United States, for 
example, is a federal crime, though several narrow exceptions 
apply.261  Determining whether a particular defendant fits within the 
class of unauthorized individuals contemplated by this provision 
requires a nuanced understanding of multiple immigration law 
processes—nonimmigrant visa stay limitations, adjustment of status 
applications, parole (as this term is used in immigration law), and the 
impact of employment authorization.262  Despite this immigration law 
mélange, criminal defense attorneys regularly defend against such 
prosecutions, having immersed themselves in the applicable law and 
facts.263  Defense attorneys in Arizona state courts, for example, 
encounter human smuggling prosecutions that turn on a person’s 
status under federal immigration laws, even when the defendant is the 
person smuggled into the United States.264  These attorneys must also 
contend with a state constitutional prohibition on setting bail in 
certain cases, including self-smuggling, that involve defendants 
without authorization to be in the country.265 
                                                        
 260.  Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050 (elimi-
nating judicial recommendations against deportation). 
 261.  See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(5) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 922(y)(2) (listing exceptions). 
 262.  See United States v. Latu, 479 F.3d 1153, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 2007) (analyzing the 
definition of “legally or unlawfully in the United States” in the context of an adjustment of 
status situation); United States v. Bazargan, 992 F.2d 844, 848–49 (8th Cir. 1993) (examin-
ing “whether the INS’s grant of an employment authorization . . . made [the defendant] a 
legal alien for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)”).  
 263.  See, e.g., United States v. Mendez, 514 F.3d 1035, 1039 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting 
that the defendant was charged with twelve counts, which ranged from possession with the 
intent to distribute methamphetamine to possession of a firearm by an alien not lawfully in 
the United States). 
 264.  See, e.g., State v. Barragan-Sierra, 196 P.3d 879, 885–86, 891 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) 
(determining that the conspiracy and human smuggling statutes “allow the person smug-
gled to be convicted of conspiracy to commit human smuggling”). 
 265.  ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 22(A)(4) (“All persons charged with crime shall be bailable 
by sufficient sureties, except: . . . For serious felony offenses as prescribed by the legislature 
if the person charged has entered or remained in the United States illegally and if the 
proof is evident or the presumption great as to the present charge.”); Ingrid V. Eagly, Local 
Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1749, 1762–63 
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More dramatically, in recent years hundreds of thousands of 
people have been prosecuted annually for federal crimes that hinge 
on immigration law.266  There were 43,688 people prosecuted for 
illegal entry and another 35,836 for illegal reentry in fiscal year 2010 
in the United States; the following fiscal year began with more federal 
prosecutions lodged for illegal reentry than for any other federal 
crime, whether related to immigration activity or not.267  Both crimes 
contain as an element of the offense a provision that is quintessential 
immigration law: the defendant must be an “alien.”268  The word 
“alien” is a term of art defined in the INA,269 and, along with its 
opposite term,  “United States citizen,” interpreted by innumerable 
courts.270 
Meanwhile, illegal reentry prosecutions require a prior, 
constitutionally sound removal.  Thus, defense attorneys must 
consider as one of their litigation tools the possibility that an 
underlying removal order did not conform to due process 
requirements dependent on immigration law.271  For example, the 
                                                        
(2011) (“Undocumented immigrants charged with smuggling themselves could now be 
detained without any possibility of bond.”). 
 266.  Sklansky, supra note 217, at 164–68; see also supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 267.  Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Lead Charges for Criminal Immigration 
Prosecutions, FY 1986–FY 2011, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/251/include/ 
imm_charges.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2013); Transactional Records Access Clearing-
house, Illegal Reentry Becomes Top Criminal Charge, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports 
/251/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (explaining that the 18,552 illegal reentry prosecutions 
filed in the first six months of fiscal year 2011 comprised forty-seven percent of all federal 
criminal prosecutions).  Accordingly, the projected numbers of recorded prosecutions for 
fiscal year 2011 are 35,540 for illegal entry and 37,104 for illegal reentry.  Lead Charges for 
Criminal Immigration Prosecutions, FY 1986–FY 2011, supra. 
 268.  8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006) (improper entry by alien); 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006) (reentry 
of removed aliens). 
 269.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006) (“The term ‘alien’ means any person not a citizen 
or national of the United States.”). 
 270.  See supra notes 242–257, 261–265 and accompanying text. 
 271.  Cf. United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837 (1987) (noting that if the 
reentry of removed aliens statute “envisions that a court may impose a criminal penalty for 
reentry after any deportation, regardless of how violative of the rights of the alien the de-
portation proceeding may have been, the statute does not comport with . . . due process”), 
superseded by statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) (2006), as recognized in United States v. Perez-
Madrid, 71 F. App’x 795 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Barranza-Leon, 575 F.2d 218, 
220 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Although deportation proceedings are civil in nature, and thus not 
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Second Circuit in United States v. Perez272 concluded that an illegal 
reentry prosecution could not stand because the underlying removal 
proceeding was constitutionally defective.273  Importantly, the 
noncitizen defendant in the illegal reentry prosecution, through 
counsel, was able to show that his deportation order was 
constitutionally defective by focusing on the immigration attorney’s 
failure to request a form of relief from removal that existed at the 
time of the deportation proceeding, but that had been repealed years 
before the illegal reentry prosecution was initiated.274  In mounting 
this defense, the criminal defense attorney representing the 
noncitizen in the illegal reentry prosecution evidenced a sophisticated 
understanding of immigration law, past and present, and its 
importance in the criminal case.275 
In other instances, an attorney defending against an illegal 
reentry prosecution must determine whether a defendant’s prior 
offense constitutes an aggravated felony.  This category of crimes, a 
basis for deportation since 1988,276 has become one of the most 
poignant features of modern immigration law.  Because the scope of 
“aggravated felony” is broad (encompassing twenty-one types of 
crimes)277 and its impact far-reaching (most notably, resulting in 
removal and ineligibility for cancellation of removal),278 the 
                                                        
subject to the full panoply of procedural safeguards accompanying criminal trials, we have 
held that due process must be afforded in deportation hearings.” (citation omitted)). 
 272.  330 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 273.  Id. at 101, 104.  The court determined that the removal proceeding was funda-
mentally unfair because the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel guar-
antied by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.  Id. at 101; see U.S. CONST. amend. V 
(“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .”). 
 274.  Id. at 99–100, 102 (noting that the defendant’s immigration attorney did not “seek 
relief under . . . Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, which at that 
time permitted the Attorney General to grant a discretionary waiver of deportation”). 
 275.  Cf. id. at 100–02 (determining that “[a]lthough [the defendant] did not appeal his 
deportation order to the BIA, he has satisfied the exhaustion requirement by appealing 
the denial of his motion to reopen to the BIA” and that “[the defendant] has shown . . . 
that he could have made a strong showing in support of his application for [discretionary] 
relief” from deportation). 
 276.  Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7345(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4471 (1988). 
 277.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43) (2006) (defining “aggravated felony”). 
 278.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2) (2006) (outlining the criminal penalties for reentry 
of certain removed aliens and stating that “in the case of any alien . . . whose removal was 
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aggravated felony statutory provision emblematizes the expansiveness 
and harshness of modern immigration law that partly motivated the 
Padilla Court to act.  Yet, for its central role in modern immigration 
law practice, “aggravated felony” frequently appears in criminal 
courtrooms as the heated subject of debate among defense attorneys 
and prosecutors, especially because it carries important sentencing 
implications.279  These defense attorneys, in other words, must delve 
deep into the core of modern immigration law to best promote their 
clients’ interests. 
No matter the specific legal doctrine involved, and whether it 
historically involved immigration law knowledge, each of these state 
and federal courts constitutionally required that a defense attorney 
conduct the investigation necessary to reasonably understand the 
defendant’s predicament and provide sound advice based on that 
information.280  While no court requires unending investigation, all 
courts require as much as is necessary to exercise reasonable and 
informed judgment about how to proceed in light of the defendant’s 
goals and the strength of the prosecution’s case.  In the context of 
advice about immigration consequences that arise from conviction, 
however, Padilla seemingly alters that requirement. 
III.  STRICKLAND-LITE 
The Supreme Court’s adoption of a reasonableness standard for 
measuring effective assistance of counsel reflects an accommodation 
                                                        
subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be 
fined under such title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both” ). 
 279.  See, e.g., United States v. Esparza-Perez, 681 F.3d 228, 229 (5th Cir. 2012) (consid-
ering whether a conviction for aggravated assault qualified as a conviction for a crime of 
violence, which would increase the base offense level for an illegal reentry by sixteen lev-
els).  A crime of violence constitutes an aggravated felony under the INA.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(F) (2006).  Other federal and state courts have also litigated issues of what 
constitutes an aggravated felony.  See, e.g., Richards v. United States, 2011 WL 3875335, at 
*1, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing a claim that possession of marijuana for sale is not an ag-
gravated felony); Commonwealth v. Martinez, 966 N.E.2d 223, 225 n.2, 226–27 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2012) (determining that a conviction for distribution of powder cocaine was both an 
aggravated felony and a controlled substances offense and considering the impact of the 
resulting consequences on a Padilla-based ineffective assistance claim). 
 280.  Regarding the connection to Strickland’s second requirement, prejudice, the Su-
preme Court has explained that “our jurisprudence suggests that any amount of actual jail 
time has Sixth Amendment significance.”  Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 
(2001). 
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of multiple values, including: the recognition that sound 
representation takes many forms, a hesitation to second guess 
counsel’s decisions, and a commitment to breathe life into this Sixth 
Amendment guarantee that promotes fairness and accuracy.281  
Padilla’s two-tiered test likewise accommodates multiple goals.  On the 
one hand, the Court unmistakably signaled its appreciation of the 
interconnectedness of criminal and immigration proceedings, and 
the importance to noncitizen defendants of receiving sound advice 
about the presumptively mandatory immigration consequences of 
conviction.  On the other hand, the Court stopped short of a result 
that it felt might effectively require criminal defense attorneys to 
become immigration defense attorneys. 
Where the Strickland line of cases and Padilla diverge, however, is 
in how much investigation they require before the constitutional duty 
is satisfied.282  The Padilla Court explained that “when the deportation 
consequence is truly clear,” the constitutional mandate, or “the duty 
to give correct advice[,] is equally clear.”283  When, however, “the law 
is not succinct and straightforward . . . a criminal defense attorney 
need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending 
criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration 
consequences.”284 
Despite marking the first time that the Court has recognized any 
Sixth Amendment obligation regarding advice about immigration 
consequences, Padilla created a two-tiered duty that does not require 
attorneys to come to terms with the law affecting their clients’ future 
to the same extent as Strickland’s reasonable-investigation standard 
requires.  The first of Padilla’s two prongs—the obligation to provide 
“clear” advice when deportation is “truly clear”—requires attorneys to 
stop investigating and advise that deportation will be presumptively 
mandatory based on a cursory examination of statutory text and little 
                                                        
 281.  See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (acknowledging that “[t]he per-
formance prong of Strickland requires a defendant to show that counsel’s representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); TOMKOVICZ, supra note 58, at 165 (explaining that the Supreme “Court 
provided an open-ended, unspecific definition of the deficient performance prong [and] 
refused to impose particular obligations”).  
 282.  Cf. Zeidman, supra note 6, at 224 (describing the duty of defense counsel “to as-
sure” that he has “investigate[d] the relevant facts and law” of a client’s predicament as 
“pre-conditions to providing Padilla advice”). 
 283.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010). 
 284.  Id. 
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more, even where that advice might not prove to be an accurate 
reflection of the law.285  Meanwhile, Padilla’s other prong allows 
attorneys to cease investigating and advise simply that “adverse 
immigration consequences” may arise, even where more research 
might produce a more definite answer.286  Both levels of advice, this 
Part explains, conflict with Strickland and its progeny and threaten to 
undermine the promise at Padilla’s core: providing noncitizen 
defendants with critical information about the immigration 
consequences of conviction.287 
A.  What Padilla Requires and What It Allows 
The two-tiered standard announced in Justice Stevens’s majority 
opinion in Padilla recognizes that, despite immigration law’s long 
presence within criminal proceedings, criminal defense attorneys 
typically do not have the intimate familiarity with immigration law, 
especially with the INA’s crime-based removal and relief provisions, 
necessary to replicate an immigration attorney’s advice in removal 
proceedings.288  Nor does the Padilla standard require criminal 
defense attorneys to provide such advice.289  Whereas an immigration 
                                                        
 285.  See, e.g., United States v. Randazzo, 2011 WL 1743395, at *5–6 (E.D. Penn. 2011) 
(concluding that a defense attorney’s conduct was not constitutionally deficient where the 
attorney admitted to not being aware that the defendant’s convictions might avoid being 
classified as aggravated felonies if the court imposed multiple sentences of less than a year 
rather than a single sentence of more than a year as the court did and instead advised the 
defendant and informed the court that deportation was expected). 
 286.  See Vázquez, Realizing Padilla’s Promise, supra note 6, at 189 (“In those instances 
where Padilla would only require a generic advisement, criminal noncitizen defendants 
will be deprived of information and assistance to effectively combat removal from the 
United States but will be unable to bring a Sixth Amendment claim for relief.”). 
 287.  See id. at 190 (“Padilla will deprive certain noncitizen defendants of advice and per-
formance that the Padilla Court itself recognized to be of paramount importance.”). 
 288.  Cf. Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration 
Judge, 51 EMORY L.J. 1131, 1150 (2002) (explaining that “the JRAD option was not widely 
known among criminal defense attorneys” despite its long history).  For an example of 
some of the complexities facing immigration lawyers, see Noferi, supra note 70, at 38. 
 289.  See supra text accompanying note 284.  Whether Padilla applies to other conse-
quences of conviction remains in doubt.  See infra Part IV.A.  It is plausible that the Su-
preme Court’s rationale applies to immigration consequences as much as to other conse-
quences traditionally considered collateral to the criminal process.  The Padilla majority, 
after all, reiterated its “responsibility under the Constitution . . . that no criminal defend-
ant . . . is left to the ‘mercies of incompetent counsel.’”  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (quoting 
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attorney representing a client in removal proceedings must trudge 
into the muddy corners of immigration law in search of a viable 
argument against removal or in support of a claim for relief from 
removal,290 a defense attorney representing that same client in 
criminal proceedings can comply with Padilla without going to such 
investigative lengths; therein lies the departure from the traditional 
Strickland standard.291 
No better example exists of Padilla’s willingness to allow criminal 
defense attorneys to cease investigation far before the normal 
Strickland calculation than the facts of Padilla itself.  In the decision, 
the Supreme Court explained that Padilla’s “deportation was 
presumptively mandatory,” citing to the INA’s controlled substances 
offense provision.292  This result, the Court noted, was clear “simply 
                                                        
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).  Incompetent counsel could of course 
arise no matter what law is involved.  At the same time, the Court stressed the “unique na-
ture of deportation,” suggesting that the holding might be limited to this context.  Id. at 
1481.  Meanwhile, the two Justices who concurred took issue with what they perceived as 
the majority “downplay[ing] the severity of the burden it imposes on defense counsel,” 
which suggests that they would not be comfortable expanding Padilla beyond immigration 
consequences.  Id. at 1490 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 290.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 291.  As Mary Holper explained regarding one category of removal offense, crimes in-
volving moral turpitude (“CIMT”), “Padilla . . . left defense counsel representing nonciti-
zens with no clear obligation to read case law and determine whether a given offense will 
lead to deportation for a CIMT.”  Mary Holper, Deportation for a Sin: Why Moral Turpitude Is 
Void for Vagueness, 90 NEB. L. REV. 647, 649 (2012).  Though Noferi is correct that “the con-
stitutional impact of infringement on available discretionary relief is less clear” regarding 
challenges to removability than whether someone is deportable or inadmissible, supra note 
70, at 78 n.67, the point here is not to suggest that a criminal defense attorney should be 
required to predict how an immigration judge will exercise discretion.  Kanstroom put it 
well when he wrote that it would be improper “to focus excessively on the possible availa-
bility of discretionary relief in immigration court.”  Kanstroom, supra note 2, at 1508.  Ra-
ther, the point is that Padilla does not require criminal defense attorneys to consider how a 
conviction will affect a defendant’s statutory eligibility for relief—mandatory or discretion-
ary—and, more profoundly, it does not require the attorneys to consider the nuances of 
the substantive immigration law that will determine whether a defendant is deemed de-
portable upon conviction. 
 292.  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (“Any alien who at any time after admission 
has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regu-
lation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled sub-
stance . . . other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams 
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from reading the text of the statute.”293  As such, Padilla’s defense 
attorney was required to advise him about the possibility of 
deportation with just as much clarity. 
But a legal determination based on a superficial review of the 
law, described as all that is required in Padilla, does not necessarily tell 
noncitizen defendants concerned about their immigration status what 
they want to know—whether pleading is likely to result in forced 
repatriation.  On occasion, some of these individuals, it turns out, are 
actually U.S. citizens and thus legally immune from removal.294  
Meanwhile, lawful permanent residents are regularly convicted of 
crimes that do not result in removal.295  Not only is their removal not 
“presumptively mandatory” upon conviction, but the conviction alone 
has no bearing on their immigration status.  Similarly, thousands of 
other individuals are able to remain in the United States despite a 
conviction.  In fiscal year 2011 alone, almost 5,000 were granted the 
relief that is available to individuals with a controlled substances 
offense conviction.296  More than 2,000 individuals convicted of 
                                                        
or less of marijuana, is deportable.”); Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483; see Padilla v. Common-
wealth, 381 S.W.3d 322, 326, 328–30  (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (pointing out that deportation 
would be presumptively mandatory on the conviction of an aggravated felony). 
 293.  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
 294.  See, e.g., Lyttle v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1266–67, 1269–74 (M.D. Ga. 
2012) (describing the experience of a United States citizen who was wrongfully deported); 
Perez v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 2d 301, 303–04 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (same); DANIEL 
KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN DIASPORA 14–15, 
99–102 (2012) (“[W]rongful deportations of U.S. citizens have occurred with distressing 
frequency.”). 
 295.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006) (providing that a conviction for a 
crime involving moral turpitude results in deportability only if committed within five years 
of admission and then only if punishable by at least one year in prison); KESSELBRENNER & 
ROSENBERG, supra note 240, at 35–39 (explaining that juvenile dispositions are not convic-
tions for immigration law purposes); id. at 43–45 (noting several possibilities for avoiding a 
criminal disposition that is defined as a “conviction” for immigration law purposes, regard-
less of whether it constitutes a conviction under the relevant jurisdiction’s penal code). 
 296.  See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Due Process and Immigrant Detainee Prison 
Transfers: Moving LPRs to Isolated Prisons Violates Their Right to Counsel, 21 LA RAZA L.J. 17, 46 
(2011) [hereinafter García Hernández, Prison Transfers] (discussing options for relief 
available to lawful permanent residents); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)–(b)(1) (2006) (bar-
ring cancellation of removal for lawful permanent residents convicted of an aggravated 
felony, but not precluding eligibility for individuals convicted of a controlled substances 
offense); EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2011 STATISTICAL 
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aggravated felonies were granted relief in fiscal year 2011.297  Perhaps 
more surprisingly, an unknown number of otherwise unauthorized 
individuals are convicted of crimes without facing the possibility of 
removal.298 
A comparison between the research contemplated as necessary 
for criminal defense attorneys to conduct and the exercise that an 
immigration attorney engages in to defend against removal 
demonstrates just how cursory the Padilla requirement for 
investigation really is.  Reviewing the statutory text, as the Padilla 
majority explained, would have been sufficient to inform Padilla’s 
attorney that Padilla’s deportation was presumptively mandatory; such 
a cursory analysis, however, is an insufficient step in the immigration 
attorney’s investigative process. Padilla was convicted for controlled 
substance offenses, which, according to the Court were grounds for 
removal.299  As a lawful permanent resident of forty years,300 however, 
Padilla might have qualified for cancellation of removal, the most 
charitable form of relief from removal that currently exists in 
immigration law, even had the Court of Appeals of Kentucky not 
subsequently vacated his conviction.301  To truly predict the effect of 
the conviction on Padilla’s immigration status, an attorney would 
                                                        
YEAR BOOK R3 tbl.16 (2012) [hereinafter EOIR 2011 YEAR BOOK] (stating that 3,994 lawful 
permanent residents received cancellation of removal in fiscal year 2011 and another 892 
were granted relief under former INA § 212(c)).  For a discussion of former INA Section 
212(c), see supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
 297.  García Hernández, Prison Transfers, supra note 296, at 45 n.193; see also Hew, supra 
note 13, at 55 (explaining that protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) 
is available to individuals who have been convicted of an aggravated felony).  In fiscal year 
2011, immigration courts granted 629 CAT claims.  EOIR 2011 YEAR BOOK, supra note 296, 
at M1 tbl. 10.  Another 2,040 were granted withholding of removal, a mandatory form of 
relief available to individuals who have committed a crime so long as it is not a “particular-
ly serious crime,” a term that includes, but is not limited to, aggravated felonies where the 
term of imprisonment issued was at least five years. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (2006). 
 298.  See 8 C.F.R. § 244.1 (2012) (providing that crimes punishable by imprisonment of 
five days or less are not felonies or misdemeanors for purposes of Temporary Protected 
Status, a form of relief available to individuals without other authorization to be present in 
the United States). 
 299.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010). 
 300.  Id. at 1477. 
 301.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006) (precluding eligibility for cancellation from removal 
for lawful permanent residents convicted of an aggravated felony but not a controlled sub-
stances offense); Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322, 330–31 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012). 
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need to understand whether Padilla had a good claim for cancellation 
of removal. 
As part of this calculus, an immigration attorney would have to 
determine if any of Padilla’s convictions fell within any of the twenty-
one types of aggravated felony categories in the INA, which would 
have rendered him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal.302  
Despite having been convicted of three drug offenses—misdemeanor 
possession of marijuana, misdemeanor possession of drug 
paraphernalia, and felony trafficking in marijuana303—determining 
whether one or more of these offenses is an aggravated felony is no 
simple matter.  Unlike the simple reading of the “succinct, clear, and 
straightforward” statutory text that Padilla commands of a criminal 
defense attorney, an immigration attorney representing Padilla in 
removal proceedings would have needed to consider the many 
nuances of the drug-related aggravated felony category.  Standing 
alone, for example, Padilla’s two possession convictions were likely 
not aggravated felonies pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Lopez v. Gonzales.304  Combined, however, there is a slim possibility that 
they qualified as an aggravated felony pursuant to the Court’s 
interpretation of the “illicit trafficking” aggravated felony provision in 
Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder.305  In contrast, Padilla’s trafficking 
conviction appears at first blush to fit neatly within the illicit 
trafficking provision.  Garcia-Echaverria v. United States,306 a Sixth 
                                                        
 302.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006) (“Any alien who is convicted of an aggra-
vated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”). 
 303.  Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008), rev’d sub nom., Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559, U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1473 (2010). 
 304.  549 U.S. 47 (2006).  In Lopez, the Court determined that simple possession does 
not fall within the illicit trafficking aggravated felony category.  Id. at 52, 55–57. 
 305.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006) (“The term ‘aggravated felony’ means . . . 
illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21), including 
a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18) . . . .”); Carachuri-
Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010).  In Carachuri-Rosendo, the Court “h[e]ld that 
when a defendant has been convicted of a simple possession offense that has not been en-
hanced based on the fact of a prior conviction, he has not been ‘convicted’” of illicit traf-
ficking.  Id. at 2589–90.  Kentucky authorizes enhancement for felony offenses committed 
after having been convicted of one or more felonies.  KY. REV. STAT. § 532.080(2)–(3) 
(West 2012).  Enhancement is not permitted based on prior misdemeanor offenses.  New-
ton v. Commonwealth, 760 S.W.2d 100, 101–02 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).  The record of Pa-
dilla’s conviction makes no mention of an enhancement based on a prior conviction.   
 306.  376 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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Circuit decision interpreting this offense as an aggravated felony, only 
adds to that inclination.307  The closer examination required of a 
zealous immigration attorney, however, casts doubt on these 
impressions because Padilla was convicted under a clause other than 
the statutory language that the Sixth Circuit addressed, and one that 
may have taken the conviction out of the realm of an aggravated 
felony.308  An immigration attorney who performed this more 
exhaustive research would have arrived at a viable argument that 
Padilla’s convictions were not aggravated felonies. 
If, however, Padilla’s convictions were deemed an aggravated 
felony, then he would have been precluded from seeking cancellation 
of removal but not from other types of relief from removal; Padilla 
might have been eligible for less generous forms of relief.309  To best 
explore other relief possibilities, an attorney would be required to 
research the relevant law and, if Padilla met the statutory eligibility 
requirements, to develop a persuasive factual record to submit to an 
immigration judge who would have ultimately decided whether he 
was allowed to remain in the United States.  None of this research, 
however, is required of a criminal defense attorney providing 
constitutionally adequate representation pursuant to Padilla.310  
Indeed, without considering any of these possibilities, the Supreme 
Court was satisfied that Padilla’s conviction rendered his deportation 
presumptively mandatory and that defense counsel needed to advise 
Padilla as such. 
This outcome is particularly curious because of Justice Stevens’s 
role.  Then in his final days on the Court, Justice Stevens mustered 
seven votes to indelibly and impressively expand the right-to-counsel’s 
benefit to noncitizens.311  The accommodation that Justice Stevens’s 
opinion crafted, however, sets the Strickland-lite duty articulated above 
in sharp contrast with his earlier enthusiasm for Strickland’s duty to 
                                                        
 307.  Id. at 511–13. 
 308.  See García Hernández, After Padilla, supra note 34, at n.132. 
 309.  See supra note 296 and accompanying text. 
 310.  See, e.g., Ex parte Alfredo Olvera, No. 05–11–01349–CR, 2012 WL 2336240, at *3 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (explaining that the relevant statutory text indicated that deporta-
tion was the clear result of conviction in defendant’s case without mentioning the role of 
case law in the determination). 
 311.  Joining in Justice Stevens’ majority opinion were Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Sotomayor.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1477 (2010).  
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, filed a concurring opinion.  Id. at 1487 (Alito, 
J., concurring). 
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investigate thoroughly, or, at least, to investigate enough such that a 
decision to cease investigating is based on an informed understanding 
of the relevant law and facts. 
Justice Steven’s support for a broad duty to investigate dates back 
to 1985 when he joined Justice White’s concurring opinion in Hill v. 
Lockhart,312 expressing a desire to see Strickland’s first prong impose 
greater obligations on defense attorneys.  Although Justices White 
and Stevens concluded that the petitioner’s specific allegations were 
insufficient, even if true, to demonstrate deficiency on the part of 
counsel, the concurrence made clear that failure to inform the 
defendant about the relevant law would be deficient performance 
under Strickland.313  Had Hill claimed that his attorney knew about a 
prior conviction and still failed to advise him about the state’s 
recidivist offender enhancement law, Justices White and Stevens 
would have decided that the attorney provided ineffective 
assistance.314  Their position is particularly instructive to 
understanding Padilla because this hypothetical is akin to the error 
committed by Padilla’s attorney—providing inaccurate sentencing 
advice—and also because Padilla firmly placed deportation within the 
sentencing phase of criminal proceedings.315 
A quarter-century after Hill and two months before Padilla, 
Justice Stevens repeated his vision of a muscular Strickland deficiency 
prong in Wood v. Allen.316  This time writing his own dissenting 
opinion, joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice Stevens articulated a duty 
to investigate that fits quite neatly into the Strickland line of cases.  
Counsel must do more, he wrote, than simply decide to cease 
investigating a client’s predicament.317  Rather, a decision to end 
investigation must be “strategic.”318  Building off of Wiggins’s 
                                                        
 312.  474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
 313.  Id. at 62–63 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The failure of an attorney 
to inform his client of the relevant law clearly satisfies the first prong of the Strickland anal-
ysis . . . as such an omission cannot be said to fall within ‘the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance’ demanded by the Sixth Amendment.” (quoting Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)). 
 314.  Id.  
 315.  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480–81. 
 316.  558 U.S. 290, 130 S. Ct. 841 (2010). 
 317.  See id. at 853 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that Supreme Court precedent 
“make[s] clear that counsel’s unconsidered decision to fail to discharge that duty [to in-
vestigate mitigating evidence] cannot be strategic”). 
 318.  Id. 
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distinction between “inattention” and “reasoned strategic judgment” 
to forgo further investigation,319 Justice Stevens argued: “A decision 
cannot be fairly characterized as ‘strategic’ unless it is a conscious 
choice between two legitimate and rational alternatives.  It must be 
borne of deliberation and not happenstance, inattention, or neglect.  
Moreover, a cursory investigation does not automatically justify a 
tactical decision with respect to sentencing strategy.”320  Counsel, in 
other words, must conduct sufficient research to identify sound 
alternatives.  Only then may a constitutionally adequate attorney 
advise the defendant on how to proceed. 
Despite Justice Stevens’s positions in Hill and Wood, the majority 
opinion he authored in Padilla follows a much different path.  
Padilla’s two-tiered standard represents a conscious choice by the 
Court between two legitimate and rational objectives—(1) providing 
noncitizen defendants with important information that they want, 
while (2) attempting to avoid overburdening criminal defense 
attorneys.321  These two tiers do not, however, require that an attorney 
make “a deliberate choice between two permissible alternatives” 
available to the defendant.322  On the contrary, Padilla allows advice 
after nothing more than the “cursory investigation” Justice Stevens 
pronounced inadequate in Wood.  The Padilla majority, led by Justice 
Stevens only two months after Wood, endorsed such a practice when it 
suggested that Padilla’s attorney would have satisfied Padilla’s right-to-
counsel protection had he simply read the text of the controlled 
substances ground of removal and advised Padilla that, upon 
conviction, his deportation would become presumptively 
mandatory.323  Of course, had Padilla’s crimes fallen within a more 
amorphous ground of removal, then his attorney would have more 
easily satisfied the counsel guarantee; all the attorney would have 
needed to do was tell Padilla that “pending criminal charges may 
carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.”324 
                                                        
 319.  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 526 (2003). 
 320.  Wood, 130 S. Ct. at 853 (discussing Wiggins and Strickland) (citations omitted) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
 321.  See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010) (stating that 
there is a clear “duty to give advice” when there are clear deportation consequences while 
noting that private practitioners have a “more limited” duty when consequences “are un-
clear or uncertain”).  
 322.  Wood, 130 S. Ct. at 854. 
 323.  Id. 
 324.  Id. 
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Neither of these routes even suggests that defense attorneys must 
engage in the investigation of the law and facts relevant to a client’s 
predicament that Stevens had previously endorsed.  A Texas 
intermediate appellate court opinion illustrates how lower courts are 
applying Padilla.  In Ex parte Alfredo Olvera,325 the Court of Appeals of 
Texas, faced with an ineffective assistance claim arising from an 
instance in which an attorney told a defendant that he “could” be 
deported but did not provide the kind of certitude required by 
Padilla’s more strenuous clear-advice prong, queried the clarity of the 
relevant statutes.  Had the attorney considered the statutory text of 
the state criminal offense—in this case, assault of a public servant 
under Texas law—and the INA’s crime of violence definition, then 
the attorney would have learned that “the immigration consequences 
of a guilty plea to the assault offense in this case were clear.”326  Thus, 
the court concluded that “counsel’s duty . . . was to give [the 
noncitizen petitioner] clear advice about those consequences.”327  The 
court’s analysis turned on its reading of the penal and immigration 
statutes: a “crime of violence” is an aggravated felony;328 an “offense 
that has as an element the use . . . of physical force against the 
person” is a “crime of violence,”329 one of two prongs of the crime of 
violence definition and the only prong cited in Olvera; and the Texas 
Penal Code defines “assault” as an offense that “causes bodily injury to 
another.”330  Importantly, the court did not reference the Board of 
Immigration Appeals or judicial interpretations of any of these 
statutes.  Had it done so, it might have learned that six years earlier 
the Fifth Circuit had determined that “use of force is not an element 
of assault under section 22.01(a)(1) [of the Texas Penal Code], and 
the assault offense does not fit [18 U.S.C.] subsection 16(a)’s 
definition for crime of violence.”331  This case, which contradicts the 
                                                        
 325.  No. 05–11–01349–CR, 2012 WL 2336240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 
 326.  Id. at *3. 
 327.  Id.  
 328.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2006). 
 329.  18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2006). 
 330.  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1) (West 2011); see Olvera, 2012 WL 2336240, at 
*3 (citing the relevant statutes). 
 331.  United States v. Villegas-Hernandez, 468 F.3d 874, 879 (5th Cir. 2006); see also 
United States v. Ramirez, 606 F.3d 396, 397 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the Texas as-
sault “offense does not have, as an element, the use or threatened use of physical force”); 
United States v. Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d 1110, 1113 (10th Cir. 2008) (same).  While assault 
of a public servant is a felony under section 22.01(b) of the Texas Penal Code, the Olvera 
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court’s reading of the statutory text, is highly relevant to a Texas 
defense attorney representing a client being prosecuted in suburban 
Dallas and would likely lead a court to conclude comfortably that the 
reasonable defense attorney would have known about the law. 
Yet the Texas court in Olvera easily concluded that a barebones 
reading of the statutory text met Padilla’s mandate despite the 
obvious superficiality of such investigation.  This analysis 
unquestionably fits Justices White and Stevens’s explanation in Hill of 
deficient performance: “The failure of an attorney to inform his client 
of the relevant law clearly satisfies the first prong of the Strickland 
analysis . . . as such an omission cannot be said to fall within ‘the wide 
range of professionally competent assistance’ demanded by the Sixth 
Amendment.”332  This clear-cut pronouncement, and Justice Stevens’s 
dissenting repudiation in Wood of attorneys who decide to cease 
investigation based on inattention or neglect to their client’s 
predicament, makes a barely perceptible appearance in Padilla, which 
requires attorneys to at least consider the immigration consequences 
of conviction.  Justice Stevens’s opinion in Padilla, however, makes 
clear that attorneys do not need to consider the immigration 
consequences of conviction with the same thoroughness as they would 
the traditional sentencing impact of conviction.333 
                                                        
court cited and quoted section 22.01(a).  Olvera, 2012 WL 2336240, at *3.  Similarly, while 
it is possible that assault in Texas may be a crime of violence under the definition provided 
in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), again, the Olvera court cited and quoted section 16(a).  Id.  
 332.  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 62 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (quoting Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)). 
 333.  Though Justice Stevens’ more forceful articulation of the duty to investigate in Hill 
and Wood might be attributable to his focus in those cases on traditional criminal conse-
quences, whereas Padilla centered on a non-traditional consequence of conviction, such a 
reading is belied by the Padilla opinion.  In Padilla, Justice Stevens eviscerated any distinc-
tion between immigration consequences and traditional criminal consequences of convic-
tion that may have been thought to exist.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 
1473, 1482 (2010) (concluding that “advice regarding deportation is not categorically out-
side of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel”).  He went out of his way to ground the 
Court’s holding in the view that “deportation is an integral part . . . of the penalty that may 
be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”  Id. at 1480.  
In addition to aligning deportation with traditional criminal conviction consequences, Jus-
tice Stevens distinguished deportation from other consequences and, by extension, the 
advice required of attorneys whose clients face the possibility of deportation from that re-
quired of those attorneys whose clients face the possibility of suffering other non-
traditional consequences of conviction.  See id. at 1480–82 (discussing the “unique nature 
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Even without turning to Justice Stevens’s aged concurrence in 
Hill or his dissent in Wood, had the Padilla Court applied the robust 
body of lower court case law interpreting Strickland, the reasonable 
decision to stop investigating before advising a defendant would look 
much different than how it looks under Padilla.  A decision to stop 
investigating would require careful inquiry of the facts, diligent 
research to identify and understand applicable law, nuanced if not 
perfect comprehension of sentencing consequences, and, above all 
else, a commitment to avoid misleading a defendant.  Strickland and 
its progeny have long required as much from criminal defense 
attorneys in an effort to provide defendants with the “guiding hand of 
counsel.”334  More concretely, had Padilla followed the existing path, 
criminal defense attorneys would have been required to become 
intimately familiar with the following areas of immigration law: the 
INA’s crime-based grounds of removal; options for relief from 
removal; citizenship provisions, including derivative citizenship 
obtained through family members; the assortment of agency policies 
and regulations implementing these provisions; and the innumerable 
administrative and judicial decisions interpreting these laws.335  As if 
that were not enough, defense attorneys would need to become 
familiar with some long-repealed provisions concerning removal, 
relief from removal, and citizenship.336 
This appears to be a daunting task, but it is one that is already 
required of criminal defense attorneys representing noncitizens in 
some instances.  State and federal courts across the country, in a 
series of decisions spanning several decades, have frequently 
attributed a detailed understanding of immigration law to the 
reasonable criminal defense attorney.  As detailed above, numerous 
courts have concluded that attorneys were ineffective when they failed 
to challenge the elements of a conviction or raise a plausible claim for 
relief that rested on a nuanced familiarity with immigration law.337 
                                                        
of deportation”).  Deportation, he explained, is “unique” because it is a “severe penalty” 
that is “intimately related to the criminal process.”  Id. at 1481.  Because of this unique na-
ture, the majority shunned the direct or collateral consequences distinction with regard to 
“the specific risk of deportation,” while explicitly refusing to consider whether this distinc-
tion is generally appropriate in the Strickland context.  Id. at 1481–82.  
 334.  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932); see supra Part II.A–B.1. 
 335.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 336.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 337.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
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In its quest to remedy the significant problem of noncitizen 
defendants receiving the wrong advice or none at all, the Padilla 
Court failed to appreciate this reality.  Had the Court done so, it 
could simply have turned to the standard to which defense attorneys 
are held when providing advice about immigration law during the 
criminal proceeding.338  The Court failed to do that, however, and 
Padilla’s two-tiered standard, while an improvement from what existed 
previously,339 represents a lost opportunity, and for some noncitizen 
defendants, a requirement that they receive advice that is more 
harmful than were they to receive no advice at all. 
B.  Two Duty-to-Investigate Standards 
Padilla’s recognition of a weakened duty to investigate when 
determining the immigration consequences of conviction creates a 
troubling dichotomy: Defense attorneys must investigate the law 
concerning the substantive elements of a crime, even elements 
involving immigration law, and the penal consequences of conviction 
as fully as ever, while investigating the immigration consequences of 
conviction, even for the same crime, but to a lesser degree.  An 
attorney whose client is charged with burglary of a vehicle in Texas, 
for example, would need to investigate the relevant state statute to 
determine whether the client has any available defenses under Texas 
                                                        
 338.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 339.  See infra notes 377–379 and accompanying text.  Though Padilla has improved the 
criminal defense bar’s understanding of immigration consequences and served as a back-
end method for attacking constitutionally deficient convictions, the decision’s potential 
was limited by the Court’s determination that it does not apply retroactively.  Chaidez v. 
United States, 2013 WL 610201, *10 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2013).  Meanwhile, criminal proceedings 
in states that have developed more robust protections—for example, Colorado and New 
Mexico—are likely to remain unaffected.  See State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 803–04 (N.M. 
2004) (“We go one step further . . . and hold that an attorney’s non-advice to an alien de-
fendant on the immigration consequences of a guilty plea would also be deficient perfor-
mance.”); People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 529 (Colo. 1987) (“When defense counsel in a 
criminal case is aware that his client is an alien, he may reasonably be required to investi-
gate relevant immigration law.”).  For practice tips on Padilla’s potential applicability to 
convictions that were final prior to March 31, 2010, the date Padilla was announced, see 
SEJAL ZOTA AND DAWN SEIBERT, DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS P’SHIP, SEEKING POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF UNDER PADILLA V. KENTUCKY AFTER CHAIDEZ V. U.S. (Feb. 28, 2013), 
available at http://crimmigration.com/files/0/6/4/7/5/167292-157460/Chaidez_advisory 
_FINAL_20130228.pdf. 
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law and identify the likely sentencing provision that applies.340  An 
attorney representing a noncitizen defendant would then turn to the 
INA to explore potential immigration consequences.  There the 
attorney would read that a “burglary offense for which the term of 
imprisonment [is] at least one year” is an aggravated felony.341  
Because Texas punishes this offense with up to one year of 
imprisonment,342 the statutory text seems to be clear, succinct, and 
straightforward: If the maximum sentence is ordered, this offense 
qualifies as an aggravated felony.  Under Padilla, a defense attorney 
would then need to advise the noncitizen defendant that conviction 
means presumptively mandatory deportation.  Once that occurred, 
the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, as 
interpreted by Padilla, is met.  The fictitious defendant in this 
scenario, however, has received incorrect advice about the aggravated 
felony characterization.  Despite the clarity of the statutory text, 
burglary of a vehicle is not an aggravated felony.343 
Clearly it is troubling that, after Padilla, a noncitizen defendant 
can receive constitutionally sound but inaccurate advice about the 
immigration consequences of conviction.  This is doubly problematic 
because it creates two duty-to-investigate standards.  One standard 
applies to the advice given about the applicability of particular law—
in this example, the state burglary offense as announced by the state 
legislature and interpreted by the state courts, including possible 
defenses and sentencing consequences.  The other standard applies 
to the advice given about potential immigration consequences. 
The two investigation standards Padilla identified go from 
problematic to nonsensical when located in a jurisprudential history 
that requires defense attorneys to consider immigration law just as 
thoroughly as they consider other types of law that determine 
                                                        
 340.  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.04(a)–(e) (West 2011).  Zeidman cautions against 
focusing so narrowly on limiting the adverse impact of a guilty plea to the extent that the 
inevitability of a plea is simply presumed.  See Zeidman, supra note 6, at 215. 
 341.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2006) (citation omitted). 
 342.  See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.21(2), 30.04(d) (West 2011). 
 343.  In re Perez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1325, 1327 (B.I.A. 2000).  While the common law ver-
sion of burglary required an entry into a dwelling place, the “modern crime . . . has little in 
common with its common-law ancestor except for the title of burglary.”  WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
3 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 21.1 (2d ed.).  Indeed, many state burglary statutes in-
clude conveyances such as vehicles.  See id. at n.188 (collecting statutes from sixteen 
states).  As such, a criminal defense attorney whose client is charged with burglary gains 
little from focusing on the common law formulation. 
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criminal culpability and punishment.  Justice Alito may wish, as he 
expressed in his concurring opinion in Padilla, that “a criminal 
defense attorney should not be required to provide advice on 
immigration law, a complex specialty that generally lies outside the 
scope of a criminal defense attorney’s expertise,”344 but his wish 
conflicts with decades of reality.  For years, attorneys representing 
noncitizen criminal defendants have been required to identify the 
possible relevance of immigration law provisions, conduct the 
necessary investigation into law and facts to determine whether the 
defendant might be eligible for this form of relief from deportation, 
and advise the defendant accordingly.345 
None of the lower courts that review the advice criminal defense 
attorneys provide about immigration law provisions such as JRAD 
eligibility or aggravated felonies have suggested that the law is too 
complicated for these attorneys to possibly understand.  Nor do they 
or the justices in Padilla express any desire to let attorneys off the 
proverbial “hook” by relaxing their obligation to investigate the 
relevant law and facts affecting guilt or the non-immigration 
consequences of conviction.346  The Padilla Court’s two tiers of advice, 
however, especially the generic advice required by the second tier, 
facilitate this reduced standard of investigation with regard to 
immigration law provisions that determine whether a defendant will 
face deportation.  Under the second tier of Padilla, “[w]hen the law is 
not succinct and straightforward,”347 the attorney is not required to 
thoroughly investigate the law’s nuances.  Rather, “a criminal defense 
attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that 
pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration 
consequences.”348 
If this succinct and straightforward requirement were analogized 
to sentencing law, then the standard might read: “When the law is not 
succinct and straightforward, a criminal defense attorney need do no 
more than advise a client that pending criminal charges may carry a 
                                                        
 344.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1494 (2010) (Alito, J., concur-
ring). 
 345.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 346.  See, e.g., Lindsay C. Nash, Considering the Scope of Advisal Duties Under Padilla, 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 549, 566 (2011) (“[E]ven when courts interpret Padilla to require advice 
only about deportation-triggering pleas,” defense attorneys must, “as a practical matter . . . 
provide more comprehensive, tailored advice.”). 
 347.  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
 348.  Id. 
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risk of adverse consequences to his liberty.”  If this requirement were 
analogized to immigration law provisions that form the elements of 
an offense, then instead of finding ineffective assistance, the standard 
might be that when the law is not succinct and straightforward, the 
criminal defense attorney is required to do no more than advise the 
client that pending criminal charges might not apply to him.349 
Such advice would be unprecedented and would certainly fail 
Strickland’s duty-to-investigate requirement as it has unraveled over 
the last quarter century.350  It would also fail for the very reason that 
the United States recognizes a right to counsel: to promote 
adversarial proceedings that are fair and conclude in outcomes based 
on truth.351  Rather than receive the “guiding hand of counsel,”352 
defendants subjected to this type of relaxed duty to investigate would 
be forced to make critical decisions about their defense without the 
benefit of an attorney’s skills.  Yet this is precisely the obligation 
imposed on defense attorneys representing noncitizen defendants 
when advising them about the likelihood of remaining in the United 
States.  These individuals, the Padilla Court implicitly endorsed, are 
entitled to no Sixth Amendment duty, as many lower courts have 
concluded, nor are they entitled to the duty to investigate articulated 
in Strickland and its progeny.  Instead, they are only entitled to a 
reduced duty applicable solely to the immigration consequences of 
conviction. 
C.  Strickland-Lite’s Unintended Consequences 
The gap between the legal and factual research required by 
Padilla and what is required of an immigration attorney sometimes 
makes no difference.  In other situations, however, it may leave 
noncitizens in criminal proceedings or subsequent immigration 
proceedings in a worse position than they would have been had 
Padilla not been decided.  In its wake, Strickland-lite’s lax 
constitutional competency standard leads attorneys to misadvise 
defendants—almost certainly without malice—while not running 
                                                        
 349.  See United States v. Juarez, 672 F.3d 381, 387–88 (5th Cir. 2012) (reversing Juarez’s 
conviction on the grounds that “[a]s Juarez’s attorney, Izaguirre had a duty to inde-
pendently research the law and investigate the facts surrounding Juarez’s case,” and “[his] 
failure to investigate was unreasonable”).  For a discussion of Juarez, see supra notes 246–
257 and accompanying text. 
 350.  See supra Part II. 
 351.  See supra Part I. 
 352.  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
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amiss of the right to counsel; compare the next four examples.  In the 
first, Padilla sanctions misleading advice but does not affect the fate 
ultimately suffered by the defendant.  In contrast, the second and 
third scenarios exemplify one facet of Padilla’s downside—advice that 
complies with Strickland-lite’s reduced investigation requirement 
suggests that deportation is inevitable even though a plausible 
argument exists, identifiable upon thorough investigation of the 
relevant law, that would have avoided deportability entirely.  This can 
be referred to as Padilla’s “overadvice” problem.  The fourth and final 
example highlights a related downside—Padilla-compliant advice that 
leaves a defendant unsure of the immigration consequences of 
conviction, even though more thorough investigation could have 
provided more definitive guidance.  This is Padilla’s “underadvice” 
problem. 
The first example involves noncitizen defendant A, a lawful 
permanent resident of ten years with no prior criminal history.  A is 
charged with simple possession of cocaine, a crime that unmistakably 
falls within the controlled-substances-offense ground of removal,353 
and is offered a reduced sentence in exchange for a guilty plea.  
Regardless of whether A is advised about the immigration 
consequences of conviction, A will become presumptively deportable 
upon conviction.  Likewise, whether A is convicted through plea or 
trial, and no matter what sentence is issued, A will become 
presumptively deportable.  Relief from removal is likely available in 
immigration proceedings,354 but the possibility of relief is not part of 
the Padilla analysis, so the criminal defense attorney does not have to 
advise A about relief options.355  As is true of ninety-seven percent of 
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions,356 
                                                        
 353.  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (2006); see supra note 292. 
 354.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2006) (precluding eligibility for cancellation of re-
moval for lawful permanent residents convicted of an aggravated felony only). 
 355.  Lower courts have disagreed about whether the availability of discretionary forms 
of relief, such as cancellation of removal, render the immigration consequence of convic-
tion clear or unclear, but the Padilla Court’s failure to discuss relief, despite describing Pa-
dilla’s conviction as a type for which relief is available, suggests that courts considering Pa-
dilla claims are not required to consider relief.  García Hernández, After Padilla, supra note 
34, at Part II.B.4. 
 356.  See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS DISPOSED OF IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 
available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222009.pdf (noting that in 2009, 
83,707 out of 86,314 federal criminal defendants entered a plea of guilty or nolo conten-
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assume that A pleads guilty under the impression that deportation is 
presumptively required and without having heard a word about the 
eminently plausible possibility of receiving cancellation of removal.  
Though this advice accurately reflects the law, it falls dramatically 
short “of helping the defendant to make reasonably informed 
decisions,” which the Tenth Circuit has explained is counsel’s Sixth 
Amendment duty,357 because defendant A is concerned about her 
ability to remain in the country and not about legal niceties short of 
that.  Indeed, this standard fails to require “counsel to make an 
independent examination of the facts, circumstances, pleadings and 
laws involved and then to offer his informed opinion as to what plea 
should be entered,” as the Supreme Court explained is the criminal 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment entitlement.358 
Now take a second example.  Noncitizen defendant B, also a 
lawful permanent resident of ten years with no prior criminal history, 
is charged with statutory rape and rape, offenses that appear to fall 
within the “rape” or “sexual abuse of a minor” type of aggravated 
felony because the victim was sixteen-years-old.359  Assume that the 
prosecutor offers to drop the charge relating to rape in exchange for 
B’s guilty plea to statutory rape.  Upon receiving advice from counsel 
that conviction for either offense will result in presumptively 
mandatory deportation because, as counsel says, both are aggravated 
                                                        
dere); S. ROSENMERKEL, M. DUROSE & D. FAROLE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006-STATISTICAL 1, 3 tbl.1 (2009), available 
at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf) (“Most (94%) of felony of-
fenders sentenced [in state court] in 2006 pleaded guilty.”). 
 357.  United States v. Washington, 619 F.3d 1252, 1260 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 358.  Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948).  Though this advice might prompt 
a noncitizen defendant to seek the advice of an immigration attorney, relying on defend-
ants is perilous and inconsistent—perilous because not all noncitizen defendants are 
aware that they are not U.S. citizens and inconsistent because courts have repeatedly 
stressed that it is the attorney’s duty to raise critical factual and legal issues for defendants, 
not a defendant’s duty to raise those issues.  See also Vázquez, Realizing Padilla’s Promise, su-
pra note 6, at 193 (writing that Padilla’s two-tiered system “jeopardizes noncitizen defend-
ants by basing counsel’s duty on the perceived complexity or clarity of the law instead of 
the duty to look to the goals of the client[,] leaving an uneducated, poor and foreign-born 
individual to his own devices”). 
 359.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (2006) (defining an “aggravated felony” as includ-
ing “rape, or sexual abuse of a minor”). 
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felonies,360 B decides to reject the plea offer and instead elects to take 
his chances by going to trial.  B is then convicted of committing both 
crimes.  In the removal proceeding that results from these 
convictions, B’s immigration attorney, not the criminal defense 
attorney, successfully argues that statutory rape is not rape or sexual 
abuse of a minor and thus without more the conviction has no 
immigration impact.361  Assume, however, that the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) is able to show that rape is an aggravated 
felony.362  As a result, B is worse off, both in his criminal proceeding—
                                                        
 360.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006) (“Any alien who is convicted of an aggra-
vated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”). 
 361.  See, e.g., Perez-Gonzalez v. Holder, 667 F.3d 622, 626 (5th Cir. 2012) (explaining 
that “rape” as used in immigration law “stayed close to the common law definition” of rape 
which, in turn, “meant the ‘unlawful sexual intercourse committed by a man with a woman 
not his wife through force and against her will’ where there was ‘at least a slight penetra-
tion of the penis into the vagina.’”); Charles E. Torcia, 3 WHARTON’S CRIM. L. § 285 (15th 
ed.) (stating that “force is not an element of statutory rape” and that “statutory rape in-
volves consensual sexual intercourse”); Pelayo-Garcia v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1010, 1012, 1016 
(9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that California’s unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor of-
fense does not constitute sexual abuse of a minor for immigration law purposes because it 
lacks the scienter requirement for that aggravated felony category and criminalizes con-
duct that may not be abusive); United States v. Vidal-Mendoza, CR. No. 10–393–MA, 2011 
WL 1560987, at *3–4 (D. Or. Apr. 25, 2011) (holding that Oregon’s “statutory rape” of-
fense is not categorically a sexual abuse of a minor type of aggravated felony because it 
lacks the four year age difference between the defendant and the minor that is required 
for immigration law purposes), rev’d, No. 11–30127, 2013 WL 174495, at *7 (9th Cir. Jan. 
14, 2013) (explaining that the offense was sexual abuse of a minor at the time that the 
noncitizen was convicted, but not addressing whether it constitutes sexual abuse of a mi-
nor under subsequent Ninth Circuit case law relied upon by the district court); State v. 
Telford, 22 A.3d 43, 45, 51–52 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (explaining that third-
degree child endangerment where the defendant admitted to touching a thirteen-year-old 
girl’s breasts “for sexual pleasure” might not constitute sexual abuse of a minor and noting 
that, as a result, the defense attorney was required only to advise that adverse immigration 
consequences might result from conviction). 
 362.  Alternatively, DHS might show that B’s two convictions are crimes involving moral 
turpitude, thus rendering B removable as an “alien who at any time after admission is con-
victed of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme 
of criminal misconduct.”  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006); see Marciano v. INS, 450 
F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1971) (affirming the BIA’s determination that statutory rape is a 
crime involving moral turpitude); Ng Sui Wing v. United States, 46 F.2d 755, 756 (7th Cir. 
1931) (concluding that rape is a crime involving moral turpitude). 
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he was convicted of an additional offense beyond the plea he 
rejected—and in his immigration proceeding because he would not 
have been removable and ineligible for cancellation of removal, the 
most charitable form of relief from removal available under current 
immigration law, had he taken the plea offer. 
B’s predicament results directly from the Strickland-lite standard.  
Simply reading the relevant statutory text suggests that statutory rape 
is rape or sexual abuse of a minor, but binding case law that is 
perhaps not intuitive even to the seasoned immigration attorney 
provides otherwise.  Learning this, however, requires doing much 
more than the cursory research obligated by Padilla.  Rather, it 
requires that the attorney fully inform herself of the relevant law.363  
Without conducting in-depth research of the applicable law, an 
attorney is essentially guessing based on intuition: Statutory rape 
“sounds like” rape or sexual abuse of a minor, so then it must be.  
Prior to Padilla, the right to counsel as articulated by Strickland 
required more than high-probability guesswork based on intuition 
and a cursory reading of the statute.364  Had B’s attorney been held to 
the usual duty-to-investigate standard that requires thorough 
investigation of the relevant law, then B would have been advised that 
the offer to plead guilty to statutory rape would not have subjected 
her to removal.  B could have chosen to avoid removal by pleading.  
This would have shortened the criminal process, produced a desirable 
outcome for B (avoiding deportability), and promoted the goal of 
judicial efficiency that underlies support for plea-bargaining.  Instead, 
having been told that a statutory rape conviction would lead to the 
same unpalatable result as a rape conviction (or convictions for both), 
B chose to go to trial—a time-consuming, expensive option that the 
prosecutor probably wanted to avoid and one that needlessly exposed 
B to a consequence he could have avoided: deportability. 
Next, consider a third example, a slight variant of B’s situation.  
Noncitizen defendant C, also a lawful permanent resident of ten years 
with no prior criminal history, is charged only with statutory rape.  C’s 
defense attorney advises that this is a sexual abuse of a minor type of 
                                                        
 363.  See United States v. Loughery, 908 F.2d 1014, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (explaining 
that an attorney’s performance is measured as the “reasonableness under prevailing pro-
fessional norms” which here requires that counsel be fully informed of the facts and law, 
thoroughly advise the client on all issues, and keep the client informed about the case).  
 364.  See Nash, supra 346, at 573–74 (2011) (“Under Strickland, it is established that in-
vestigation, through research into law and fact, is fundamental to the efficacy of coun-
sel . . . .”).  
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aggravated felony.365  As such, C’s attorney adds that, upon conviction, 
C will be presumptively deportable.366  Assume that C is principally 
concerned about remaining in the United States, so C turns down a 
plea offer for statutory rape that would have resulted in less jail time.  
After a trial, C is convicted.  Having been told that he would be 
deported if convicted, C does not hire an immigration attorney to 
represent him in the subsequent removal proceedings and is soon 
deported.  Had C received no advice about the immigration 
consequences, as frequently occurred prior to Padilla, he may have 
hired an immigration attorney who would have discovered that 
statutory rape is not necessarily sexual abuse of a minor. 
As in B’s situation, the outcome in C’s circumstance arises 
directly due to Strickland-lite’s cursory investigation requirement.  C 
acted on incorrect advice in turning down a plea offer; despite this, C 
could have remained in the United States had he sought a second 
opinion while in removal proceedings.  An immigration attorney who 
fully researched the applicable law could have told C that, 
notwithstanding the statutory rape conviction, he was not removable.  
C, however, rationally chose to conserve his family’s money by not 
hiring an immigration attorney to represent him in what he had 
already been told by his criminal defense attorney was a losing battle.  
Given the high rate of unrepresented individuals in removal 
proceedings, this is not a far-fetched hypothetical.367 
Finally, a fourth example involves noncitizen defendant D who is 
a lawful permanent resident of four years rather than the ten years of 
the other hypothetical defendants.  D is charged with the crime of 
tampering with records.  His attorney concludes that this might 
constitute a crime involving moral turpitude but that the statute is not 
clear.368  As such, the attorney merely advises that conviction may have 
adverse immigration consequences for D; nothing more about 
immigration consequences is discussed.  Assume that D is offered a 
reduced sentence in exchange for a guilty plea and accepts it without 
exploring other possibilities, including the possibility of pleading to 
                                                        
 365.  See supra note 359. 
 366.  See supra note 360 and accompanying text. 
 367.  Only 51% of immigration cases completed in fiscal year 2011 involved represented 
respondents.  See EOIR 2011 YEAR BOOK, supra note 296, at G1. 
 368.  See Lopez-Penaloza v. State, 804 N.W.2d 537, 545 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) 
(“[D]etermining whether Lopez-Penaloza’s conviction for tampering with records is a 
CIMT making her eligible for deportation is not as simple as reading the text of the 
INA.”). 
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another offense or going to trial.  Even though D retains an 
immigration attorney in the subsequent removal proceedings, the 
immigration judge concludes that tampering with records is a crime 
involving moral turpitude because it involves fraudulent or dishonest 
intent.369  Because D has been a lawful permanent resident for less 
than five years, he is deportable and ineligible for cancellation of 
removal.370  Had D known that tampering with records was a crime 
involving moral turpitude that would render him removable, he could 
have taken his chances at trial or worked to negotiate a plea deal for a 
different crime that does not carry an adverse immigration 
consequence. 
D’s scenario also illustrates the perils of Strickland-lite’s lax duty to 
investigate.  D was allowed to proceed through the criminal process 
without the benefit of useful advice about the impact of a conviction 
for tampering with records on his ability to remain in the United 
States, even though more detailed research would have turned up a 
sound basis upon which to conclude that a conviction would result in 
deportation.  Unlike the numerous court decisions that have 
prohibited similarly limited advice in the sentencing context,371 Padilla 
does not require such investigation.372  Proceeding with limited 
information about a conviction’s impact on defendants’ immigration 
status is, along with the problem of defendants receiving incorrect 
                                                        
 369.  See Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof. Ethics & Conduct v. Romeo, 554 N.W.2d 552, 
554 (Iowa 1996) (explaining that, for purposes of attorney licensure, “the term ‘moral 
turpitude’ connotes behavior involving ‘fraudulent or dishonest intent’” and that Iowa’s 
tampering with records offense “on its face, involves moral turpitude” (citations omitted)). 
 370.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006) (“Any alien who . . . is convicted of a crime 
involving moral turpitude committed within five years . . . after the date of admission, and 
is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed, is de-
portable.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(1) (2006) (“The Attorney General may cancel removal in 
the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the al-
ien . . . has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 
years . . . .”). 
 371.  See supra Part II.B. 
 372.  See Kostraba v. Minnesota, No. A11–319, 2011 WL 5829141, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Nov. 21, 2011) (concluding that an attorney was required to provide only the general advi-
sory because the law was too complex to be easily determined); see also People v. Cristache, 
907 N.Y.S.2d 833, 842–43 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2010) (concluding that an attorney was required 
only to provide the general advisory because the removal consequence was “unclear or un-
certain” despite the fact that, as the court explained, two of the defendant’s crimes were 
crimes involving moral turpitude that, when combined, trigger deportation). 
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advice about a conviction’s impact, the very dilemma that Padilla 
sought to remedy. 
In each example, the criminal defense attorney complied with 
Padilla by examining the crime charged and the crime-based 
provisions of the INA and by concluding based on the language of the 
statutory grounds for removal that, upon conviction, deportation 
would be presumptively mandatory or that adverse immigration 
consequences may arise.  And in the four hypothetical scenarios, the 
criminal defense attorney advised the defendant accordingly, as 
Padilla requires.  The defendant in each example then acted quite 
rationally by, in the first and fourth examples, pleading guilty in 
exchange for a reduced sentence, and, in the second and third 
examples, taking his chances at trial.  Until Padilla (and perhaps after 
Padilla outside the immigration consequences context),373 the duty to 
investigate required that counsel provide the defendant with her 
informed opinion based on “thorough investigation.”374  
Representation has been deemed deficient when attorneys promised 
less severe punishment than what the law required, when they 
incorrectly advised that more severe punishment awaited, when they 
muddled the compounding effects of multiple convictions, or when 
they adversely affected the defendant’s calculation about the wisdom 
of pleading or going to trial.375  As it currently stands, however, Padilla 
allows similarly faulty advice to proceed under constitutional cover 
when it comes to the immigration consequences of conviction.376  The 
end result is that some noncitizen criminal defendants are left to 
make critical decisions about whether or not to accept a plea based 
on incorrect or incomplete advice. 
                                                        
 373.  See infra Part IV. 
 374.  See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (explaining that “trial counsel did 
not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s back-
ground” in omitting “voluminous” information regarding the defendant’s background); 
Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 497 (2d Cir. 1996) (describing the “effective assistance of 
counsel” as assistance that includes an “informed opinion as to what pleas should be en-
tered” based on a “suitable inquiry” into what valid defenses exist (quoting Von Moltke v. 
Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948))). 
 375.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 376.  See supra Part III.A–B. 
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IV.  A CREEPING THRESHOLD 
This Article has endeavored to show that Padilla treads a new 
route alongside Strickland’s well-worn path.  The majority opinion is 
written in the language of Strickland’s two-pronged test and has been 
applied as an extension of that foundational framework.  For all of 
Strickland’s shortcomings, on the whole, noncitizen defendants have 
gained much by the Padilla Court’s recognition that their 
immigration concerns come within Strickland’s purview.  For instance, 
innumerable immigration law specialists have provided educational 
opportunities for criminal defense attorneys in the years since Padilla 
was issued.377  Meanwhile, many attorneys have successfully vacated 
convictions obtained in violation of Padilla’s mandate.378  In this sense 
there can be no doubt that Padilla is of immense benefit to many—
perhaps even most—noncitizen defendants.379 
Padilla is not, however, a panacea.  Instead, it is a mixed bag that 
gives to some noncitizen defendants and takes from others.  Padilla is 
not Strickland, plain and simple, and some noncitizen defendants are 
worse off with advice that complies with Padilla than they might be 
with no advice at all.380  While troubling in and of its own right, Padilla 
presents other problematic consequences.  First, the two-tiered test 
fits within a pattern of diminished procedural protections in criminal 
cases based on the immigrant identity of defendants.  Second, the 
                                                        
 377.  See, e.g., N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: THE NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL 
COURT SYSTEM, ONE YEAR LATER 4 (2011), available at http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/ 
report/uploads/PadillaCrimCtsCJOReportFINAL6.15.11.pdf (listing several trainings in 
the New York area and the increased demand for immigration expertise within criminal 
defender organizations). 
 378.  See, e.g., United States v. Reid, No. 1:97-CR-94, 2011 WL 3417235, at *5 (S.D. Ohio 
Aug. 4, 2011) (concluding that the defendant’s “primary concern was the effect of his 
criminal charges on his immigration status” and that “he was directly prejudiced when he 
entered the plea after being informed incorrectly of the deportation consequences”).  For 
an example of one attorney from Texas who successfully used a Padilla claim to vacate a 
conviction, then successfully terminated removal proceedings, see 1 Client, 2 Wins: Success-
ful Padilla Claims in Crim & Immigration Courts, CRIMMIGRATION.COM (July 10, 2012, 4:00 
AM), http://crimmigration.com/2012/07/10/1-client-2-wins-successful-padilla-claims-in-
crim—immigration-courts.aspx. 
 379.  For a first-person account of Padilla’s impact on noncitizens and their families, see 
1st Person Account: Why Padilla Matters, CRIMMIGRATION.COM, http://crimmigration.com/ 
2012/05/24/1st-person-account-why-padilla-matters.aspx (May 29, 2012, 4:00 AM). 
 380.  See supra Part III.C. 
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Court’s decision portends a worrisome future: Will Strickland-lite 
become the new duty-to-investigate standard for all criminal 
defendants? 
A.  A Pattern of Relaxed Procedural Protections 
Relaxing the procedural norms used in criminal proceedings 
involving immigrants may appear anomalous, but it would not be the 
first time this has happened.  Professor Jennifer Chacón has written 
insightfully about law enforcement’s ability to circumvent traditional 
procedural limitations by relying on the much looser procedures of 
immigration law when it is more convenient to do so.  She has 
observed “that the protective features of criminal investigation and 
adjudication are melting away at the edges in certain criminal cases 
involving migration-related offenses.”381  For instance, “[r]ogue 
agents” can investigate immigration-related crimes without concern 
for internal regulations or Fourth Amendment limitations “because 
there is almost no chance of an impoverished migrant bringing—
much less winning—a civil suit from outside of the country after 
removal.”382  Or, as occurred in Abel v. United States,383 a case decided 
by the Supreme Court in 1960, criminal law enforcement agents 
(from the FBI) can take the following actions: ask immigration agents 
(from the now-nonexistent Immigration and Naturalization Service) 
to obtain an administrative search warrant for an individual thought 
to have engaged in espionage, arrest the individual, transport the 
detainee from New York to an immigration prison in Texas, and make 
the detainee available to FBI interrogators.384  Despite the fact that the 
FBI sought the INS’s assistance because it lacked the evidence to 
obtain a criminal warrant, the Court refused to exclude evidence 
obtained during the search and used in a subsequent criminal 
prosecution for espionage—the very activity that set off the FBI’s 
                                                        
 381.  Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR 135, 137 (2009). 
 382.  Id. at 145–46; see KANSTROOM, supra note 294, at 59 (observing that even federal 
agents “trained to comply with [the] Fourth Amendment” frequently utilize home raids 
because “violations are much less likely to be proven in court in deportation cases than in 
criminal cases”). 
 383.  362 U.S. 217 (1960). 
 384.  Id. at 219–25 (describing a series of events involving searches and seizures by the 
FBI and INS that the Supreme Court determined were not unconstitutional).   
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investigation.385  As such, law enforcement officers who are so 
inclined, including immigration agents, can usually get around the 
Fourth Amendment’s limitations on their powers without fear of 
losing the ability to use illegally obtained evidence in civil removal 
proceedings386 or criminal prosecutions for any type of crime so long 
as the constitutional violation was committed in the course of 
investigating a possible violation of civil immigration law.387 
Furthermore, the procedures used in criminal matters involving 
immigration-related crimes have in recent years increasingly 
resembled the far more lax constitutional and statutory structure of 
removal proceedings.388  Operation Streamline, a Justice Department 
initiative launched in 2005, through which the federal government 
prosecutes unauthorized individuals for committing the crime of 
illegal entry or illegal reentry, has resulted in skyrocketing criminal 
dockets in federal district and magistrate courts.389  According to the 
                                                        
 385.  Id. at 226, 228–29, 237–41.  At the time, INS district directors, acting as the Attor-
ney General’s surrogate, were authorized to issue an administrative arrest warrant whenev-
er it appeared that the arrest of a noncitizen was “necessary or desirable.”  Id. at 232 (citing 
INA § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1952)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(a) (1957) (providing 
that a noncitizen “may be arrested and taken into custody under the authority of a warrant 
of arrest issued by a district director whenever, in his discretion, it appears that the arrest 
of the respondent is necessary or desirable”). 
 386.  See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (stating that application of 
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule would present too high a cost in civil deporta-
tion hearings). 
 387.  See Abel, 362 U.S. at 237 (“We conclude . . . that government officers who effect a 
deportation arrest have a right of incidental search analogous to the search permitted 
criminal law-enforcement officers.”); United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 232 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (concluding that, despite indications that a planned criminal prosecution moti-
vated the defendant’s arrest, there was evidence of “an administrative purpose” because 
“immigration agents testified that they arrested Oscar-Torres simply to deport him”). 
 388.  See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1351 (2010) 
(observing that “criminal law can function as immigration law . . . by operating as a border 
screening device”).  
 389.  See DONALD KERWIN & KRISTEN MCCABE, MIGRATION POLICY INST., ARRESTED ON 
ENTRY: OPERATION STREAMLINE AND THE PROSECUTION OF IMMIGRATION CRIMES (Apr. 29, 
2010), http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/print.cfm?ID=780. (noting the 
steep rise from 39,458 immigration prosecutions in fiscal year 2007 to 79,431 in fiscal year 
2008, ultimately reaching an “all-time high” in fiscal year 2009 where illegal entry and ille-
gal reentry cases made up ninety-two percent of the 91,899 Operation Streamline prosecu-
tions); see also Eagly, supra note 388, at 1351 (“Defendants are processed en masse in what 
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Ninth Circuit’s Judicial Council, “Tucson division magistrate judges 
hear 70 Operation Streamline cases per workday.  During Calendar 
Year 2010, the Tucson Division disposed of 20,066 immigration petty 
offense cases, of which 16,981 were part of Operation Streamline.”390  
This caseload, the Judicial Council added, is “crushing” and “taking a 
severe toll on staff.”391  In response, some “court[s] have also adopted 
the practice of hearing criminal immigration cases en masse, meaning 
that multiple persons (as many as fifty to one hundred) appear at the 
same time before a judge.”392 
Obligated to both preside over mass hearings and ensure that 
defendants receive key legal protections, some judges have expressed 
concern about the fast-paced, overwhelmed courtrooms dedicated to 
Operation Streamline.  For example, the chief judge of the U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Mexico explained: 
 The increase in our criminal caseload, especially in Las 
Cruces, has caused us to conduct hearings in a way that 
we’ve never had to conduct them before, and in a way that 
other jurisdictions don’t have to.  We have . . . up to 90 
defendants in a courtroom.  Our magistrate judges try very 
hard to conduct their hearings in a way that is 
understandable to the defendants.  But most of our 
defendants have a first or second grade education in their 
native countries.  Some of them are not even able to read in 
their native languages.  And so, we explain to them their 
constitutional rights in a legal system entirely foreign to 
them. 
 You line them up in a courtroom that is intimidating even 
to American citizens, and we ask them to waive their 
constitutional rights.  It is a difficult atmosphere in which to 
waive important constitutional rights, and to ask them if they 
understand their rights.  Defendants in other parts of the 
country do not have to give up critical rights in this 
                                                        
is frequently described as a ‘cattle call’ or an ‘assembly line’ in which defense attorneys 
provide minimal representation, often to multiple defendants at the same time.”). 
 390.  In re Approval of Jud. Emer. Decl. in Dist. of Ariz., 639 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir. Jud. 
Council 2011). 
 391.  Id. at 979. 
 392.  Kerwin & McCabe, supra note 389. 
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atmosphere, only in the border districts because of this 
exploding caseload.393 
The few Operation Streamline cases to have reached the courts 
of appeal provide some insight into the communications between 
defendants and judges.  After the judge addresses the defendants 
collectively, including for purposes of advising them of their 
constitutional rights, the defendants respond with a “[g]eneral yes 
answer.”394  These proceedings have become so rote that one defense 
attorney described it as “not really practicing law,” while other 
individuals involved in Operation Streamline proceedings have 
likened them to “assembly-line justice” or a “cattle call.”395  Despite 
misgivings expressed by some judges, Operation Streamline remains 
in effect.  So long as federal prosecutors continue to charge massive 
numbers of people with low-level immigration crimes, courts will 
likely continue to use these procedures, which one Ninth Circuit 
panel described as a “shortcut” that is “understandable” and 
“reasonable.”396 
Though persistent, these shortcut procedures nonetheless raise 
“serious questions . . . as to whether all of these pleas are actually 
considered and intelligent,” notes Professor Chacón.397  Indeed, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that mass plea hearings involving forty-seven 
or, in another incident that was part of the same consolidated case, 
fifty defendants, prevented the judge from addressing each defendant 
“personally” prior to accepting a plea and ensuring that each plea was 
entered voluntarily, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11(b).398  In the court’s words, “[n]either an indistinct 
murmur or medley of yeses nor a presumption that all those brought 
to court by the Border Patrol must have crossed the border is 
                                                        
 393.  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON THE IMPACT ON THE JUDICIARY OF 
LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER 16 (2008). 
 394.  United States v. Diaz-Ramirez, 646 F.3d 653, 655 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2011); see also 
United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 695–97 (9th Cir. 2009) (evidencing similar 
responses in the record). 
 395.  Eagly, supra note 388, at 1351 n.405 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 396.  Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d at 693. 
 397.  Chacón, supra note 381, at 146–47 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 398.  See Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d at 699–701; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (“Before the 
court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the defendant may be placed under 
oath, and the court must address the defendant personally in open court.”). 
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sufficient to show that each defendant pleaded voluntarily.”399  Yet the 
court upheld the convictions because the defendants did not meet 
the stringent plain error standard of review.400  In the years that have 
elapsed since the 2009 Roblero-Solis decision, the Ninth Circuit has 
twice upheld convictions entered in groups of sixty-seven 
defendants.401  On both occasions, the court concluded that the 
defendants’ Fifth Amendment due process rights were not violated.402 
Another policy initiative intended to facilitate federal criminal 
prosecutions of immigration-related crimes similarly treads on 
procedural protections.  Implemented by federal prosecutors in the 
Southern District of California in the 1990s, “fast-track” plea 
agreements offer noncitizen defendants charged with an immigration 
crime a reduced sentence in exchange for quickly waiving a host of 
rights and consenting to immediate sentencing and removal.403  
                                                        
 399.  Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d at 700. 
 400.  Id. at 701. 
 401.  See United States v. Diaz-Ramirez, 646 F.3d 653, 655, 658 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding 
that neither defendant demonstrated “that they would not have pleaded guilty if the plea 
hearing had been more individualized”); United States v. Escamilla-Rojas, 640 F.3d 1055, 
1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the defendant received “adequate” represen-
tation despite a temporary separation because she failed to demonstrate with a “reasonable 
probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different” had counsel 
been present (citations omitted)). 
 402.  Diaz-Ramirez, 646 F.3d at 656–58; Escamilla-Rojas, 640 F.3d at 1062. 
 403.  See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 137, 146 (2005) (“In the last decade, federal prosecutors along the southwestern 
border established fast-track programs . . . .  [T]hese programs typically ask defendants to 
waive indictment, discovery, and presentence reports; plead guilty at the initial appear-
ance; and consent to immediate sentencing.  In return, prosecutors agree to recommend 
downward departures or let defendants plead to lesser charges.”); see also Alan D. Bersin & 
Judith S. Feigin, The Rule of Law at the Border: Reinventing Prosecution Policy in the Southern 
District of California, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 285, 301 (1998) (“The centerpiece of our new 
criminal alien policy was a ‘fast-track’ system whereby discovery was provided, and a prein-
dictment plea offer made, within 24 hours of arraignment.”).  The early fast track agree-
ments routinely reduced the maximum term of imprisonment from twenty years to two 
years.  Id.  Current Department of Justice policy requires that defendants waive their rights 
to seek to suppress evidence, to discovery, to a claimed defect in the indictment or infor-
mation, to an appeal, and to seek a sentencing variance.  See Memorandum from James M. 
Cole, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice to All United States Attorneys 3–4 
(Jan. 31, 2012) [hereinafter Cole Memo], available at www.justice.gov/dag/fast-track-
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Because the defendant agrees to removal in the criminal proceeding, 
a separate administrative removal proceeding and its concomitant 
imprisonment become unnecessary.404  In this way, the fast-track 
criminal process was over in a median of less than ten days, according 
to 2008 data analyzed by Professor Ingrid V. Eagly.405  Thanks in large 
part to the fast-track process, criminal prosecutions of immigration 
crimes moved through the court system much more rapidly than any 
other type of crime; the next quickest category in 2008, white collar 
crime, took approximately 250 days from start to finish, with drug and 
weapons crimes each hovering near the 270-days mark.406  Today, fast-
track programs are available in every jurisdiction in which felony 
illegal reentry offenses are prosecuted; plus, they have received 
congressional sanction mandating oversight by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission.407 
Such quick adjudication means immigration prosecutions are 
individually less taxing than other types of prosecutions on the 
criminal justice system.  Professor Eagly explains: “Not only do federal 
prosecutors spend less time on these cases, but judges also spend less 
time.  In fact, when compared to all other felony criminal matters, 
judges spend the least time on immigration.”408  More pertinent to the 
                                                        
program.pdf  (outlining the “Minimum Requirements for ‘Fast-Track’ Plea Agree-
ment[s]”). 
 404.  See Bersin & Feigin, supra note 403, at 301 (noting that “the stipulated removal or-
der guarantees that the defendant will be sent to his country of origin immediately . . . ra-
ther than after further prolonged INS detention and a potentially protracted hearing and 
appeals process”). 
 405.  See Eagly, supra note 388, at 1324 (noting that “[b]y 2008, the median number of 
days for immigration case processing was less than ten, compared with over 250 for other 
crime categories”). 
 406.  Id. at 1325. 
 407.  See Cole Memo, supra note 403, at 1, 4 (explaining that the PROTECT Act, passed 
by Congress in 2003, “harmonized these [‘fast-track’] programs with the departure provi-
sions of the federal Sentencing Guidelines” and that all “[d]istricts prosecuting felony ille-
gal reentry cases should implement this new policy no later than by March 1, 2012”). 
 408.  See Eagly, supra note 388, at 1324.  For this point, Eagly relies on the “case weight” 
assigned to the various civil and criminal matters that federal district courts hear.  See id. at 
1324 n.261 (citing PATRICIA LOMBARD & CAROL KRAFKA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 2003–2004 
DISTRICT COURT CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY: FINAL REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
JUDICIAL STATISTICS OF THE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL RESOURCES OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 5–6 (2005)).  This “case weight,” determined by re-
searchers at the Federal Judicial Center, measures the interaction of “(1) the different 
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right to counsel, however, is the impact fast-track proceedings have on 
defense attorneys.  Public defenders have complained that fast-track 
proceedings—which typically give the defendant two weeks or less to 
decide whether to accept or to reject the plea offer409—require 
defendants to make a decision on the offer “before we have adequate 
time to investigate their lives and circumstances.”410  In practice this 
means attorneys sometimes lack the time necessary to adequately 
investigate the defendant’s background, including the possibility that 
a client is a U.S. citizen and thus has an absolute defense to an 
immigration crime.411  Even if an attorney later discovers an 
appealable issue, there is little chance of success because fast-track 
agreements require that the defendant waive the right to appeal.412  
The end result is that fast-track proceedings reduce procedural 
protections and, as Stephanos Bibas posits, may increase the 
likelihood of convicting the innocent.413  Nowhere else in the federal 
                                                        
events that a judge must complete to process a case (e.g., hold hearings, read briefs, de-
cide motions, and conduct trials) and (2) the amount of time required to accomplish 
those events.”  Id. at 1.  The two immigration-related categories, “alien smuggling” and 
“other immigration,” were weighted 0.57 and 0.47, respectively, whereas drug offenses 
ranged from a low of 0.86 for possession to a high of 4.36 for continuing criminal enter-
prise cases; firearms offenses were weighted 1.00; “robbery and burglary” received a 0.71 
weight; and a miscellaneous “other felony offenses” category was weighted 1.00.  Id. at 6 
tbl.1. 
 409.  Id. at 1322. 
 410.  See Joint Statement of Thomas W. Hillier II, Fed. Pub. Defender, W. Dist. of Wash., 
& Davina Chen, Assistant Fed. Pub. Defender, Cent. Dist. of Cal., The Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984: 25 Years Later: Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm. 28 (May 
27, 2009) [hereinafter Hillier & Chen].  
 411.  See id. (“Competent attorneys have had the experience of advising their clients to 
plead guilty and learning only later that they were U.S. citizens . . . .”). 
 412.  Cole Memo, supra note 403, at 3–4. 
 413.  Bibas, supra note 403, at 147; see Eagly, supra note 388, at 1324–25 (noting the 
widespread concern about the increased likelihood of convicting the innocent).  Alt-
hough, as Victor C. Romero argues, unauthorized border crossings are strict liability of-
fenses and whether or not someone crossed the border without permission is rarely a 
complicated determination, there are other considerations that may result in the convic-
tion of innocent individuals: For example, a person may be a United States citizen, which 
is a defense to illegal entry and illegal reentry, see supra notes 248–257, 294 and accompa-
nying text, or may not have been deported as required by the illegal reentry statute.  See 
Victor C. Romero, Decriminalizing Border Crossings, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 273, 275 (2010) 
(discussing factors that might criminalize an otherwise innocent person); see also United 
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criminal realm are such perfunctory prosecutions routine.414  Indeed, 
even though fast-track proceedings could operate in any substantive 
category of offense, in practice they are reserved almost exclusively for 
immigration crimes.415 
Strickland-lite follows the path worn by Operation Streamline and 
fast-track agreements insofar as each sacrifices procedural norms at 
the heart of modern criminal proceedings for the sake of efficiency.416  
Streamline proceedings and fast-track pleading give short shrift to the 
personalized attention that the Constitution and court rules typically 
require defense attorneys and judges to give to defendants.417  When it 
comes to immigration crime prosecutions, these programs privilege 
efficiency over thoughtful deliberation; the principal goal is to move 
massive numbers of cases through the system.418  Ensuring that 
defendants and their attorneys have the opportunity to fully 
contemplate the defendant’s predicament is, at best, a secondary 
goal—one that frequently goes unrealized.  Likewise, Padilla’s 
Strickland-lite framework redefines the duty to investigate for one class 
of defendants: noncitizens and those thought to be noncitizens who 
may face removal upon conviction.419  Instead of requiring thorough 
investigation of the potentially relevant laws and facts affecting these 
defendants’ ability to remain in the United States, Strickland-lite 
                                                        
States v. Mendoza-Alvarez, 79 F.3d 96, 97–98 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the govern-
ment failed to prove that an individual had been deported even though he pleaded guilty 
to illegal reentry). 
 414.  See Eagly, supra note 388, at 1321 (noting that “immigration has bred a unique 
form of federal criminal adjudication”). 
 415.  Id. at 1322–23; see also Cole Memo, supra note 403, at 1 (describing fast-track pro-
grams as a strategy “to handle increasingly large numbers of criminal immigration cases”). 
 416.  See Kerwin & McCabe, supra note 389, at 2 (“The high volume of illegal-entry pros-
ecutions has forced many magistrate judges to complete court proceedings—explaining 
the charges, reading the accused his or her rights, accepting a plea, and sentencing—in a 
single hearing.”). 
 417.  Id. 
 418.  See id. at 2–3 (magistrate courts have adopted the practice of hearing criminal 
immigration cases en masse—as many as fifty to 100 at once). 
 419.  See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010) (describing the 
duties of a criminal defense attorney when dealing with immigration law cases). 
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lowers the measure of constitutional competence to a modicum of 
investigation.420 
Though Strickland-lite shares much with these examples, it 
deviates in one critical aspect: Padilla is a substantive change to 
criminal procedure, whereas Operation Streamline and fast-track 
pleas are changes to the way criminal cases are investigated or 
prosecuted.  As a right-to-counsel decision, Padilla alters our 
understanding of the Sixth Amendment, but Operation Streamline 
and fast-track pleas fall outside the Constitution’s reach.421  
Remedying the problematic effects of non-constitutional practices is 
much easier—a change in departmental policy or statutory 
amendment suffices—than remedying Padilla’s pitfalls, so the 
likelihood is that Strickland-lite will become more entrenched.  
Indeed, even recent developments suggesting that the exclusionary 
rule is undergoing a revival in removal proceedings support this 
proposition: Those cases, involving what the Third Circuit aptly 
described in one instance as an “ordeal,” have been limited to the 
most egregious of circumstances.422  Cases involving governmental 
conduct that might otherwise constitute nothing more than an 
ordinary Fourth Amendment violation, however, continue beyond 
constitutional reproach.423 
                                                        
 420.  See id. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that a criminal defense attorney need 
only “advise the defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse immigration con-
sequences and that . . . [he] should consult an immigration attorney”). 
 421.  Compare id. at 1482 (majority opinion) (concluding that advice regarding deporta-
tion is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel), with Kerwin & McCabe, supra note 389, at 2–3 (describing the en masse sentencing 
procedures). 
 422.  See, e.g., Oliva-Ramos v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 259, 262–64, 274–82 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(stating that the exclusionary rule applies in removal proceedings to egregious or wide-
spread constitutional violations); Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(leaving open the possibility that the exclusionary rule applies in removal proceedings to 
egregious violations); Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006) (hold-
ing that the exclusionary rule apples in removal proceedings to egregious violations); 
Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 493 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); Irene Scharf, The Exclusionary 
Rule in Immigration Proceedings: Where It Was, Where It Is, and Where It May Be Going, 12 SAN 
DIEGO INT’L L.J. 53, 54, 80 (2010) (providing two recent examples of successful uses of the 
exclusionary rule in removal proceedings). 
 423.  See Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 236 (discussing cases involving noncitizens and the 
Fourth Amendment). 
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B.  Padilla’s Slippery Edges 
Strickland-lite creates two duty-to-investigate standards and 
furthers a trend in which procedural protections in criminal 
proceedings involving immigrants are lowered.  In addition, the 
historical tendency to use cases involving immigrants to bend 
constitutional norms demands that we ask whether Strickland-lite 
represents the future of the duty-to-investigate standard applicable in 
all cases, whether the defendant is a U.S. citizen or not.  Though 
explicitly focused on noncitizen defendants and their right to advice 
about immigration consequences, Padilla, as is frequently true of 
Supreme Court decisions, has slippery edges.424  Already, the Court’s 
reasoning has been applied to govern the right to advice about 
collateral consequences that are intricately tied to conviction and are 
of great importance to many defendants.  For example, at least one 
federal appellate court and a number of state appellate courts have 
extended Padilla’s reasoning to sexual offender registration 
requirements.425  Another court held that, pursuant to Padilla, a 
                                                        
 424.  Indeed, Justices Alito and Scalia expressed concern that Padilla’s reasoning was 
not limited to immigration consequences.  See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 
1473, 1488 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (“This case happens to involve removal, but crim-
inal convictions can carry a wide variety of consequences other than conviction and sen-
tencing . . . .”); see also id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he concurrence’s suggestion 
that counsel must warn defendants of potential removal consequences . . . cannot be lim-
ited to those consequences except by judicial caprice.” (citation omitted)). 
 425.  See, e.g., Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2010); see also 
Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 389 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (concluding that failure to advise a 
client that a guilty plea will require registration as a sex offender is constitutionally defi-
cient performance); People v. Fonville, 804 N.W.2d 878, 894–95 (Mich. App. 2011) (con-
cluding that “applying the Padilla rationale to this case supports a holding that defense 
counsel must advise a defendant that registration as a sexual offender is a consequence of 
the defendant’s guilty plea”); State v. Powell, 935 N.E.2d 85, 92 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) 
(concluding that defendant received ineffective counsel in that he was not advised that 
voyeurism was a registration-exempt sexually oriented offense).  But see United States v. 
Francis, No. 5:10-cv-7114-KSF, 2010 WL 6428639, at 3 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 30, 2010) (“[T]he 
Court observe[d] that civil commitment cannot be said automatically or certainly to occur, 
based on a given result in another proceeding.  That is, unlike deportation, as addressed 
by the Supreme Court in Padilla, civil commitment requires significant additional proceed-
ings.”).  The Second Circuit distinguished Padilla’s Sixth Amendment holding from the 
obligations imposed upon courts by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and Rule 11 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to inform defendants about certain conse-
quences of conviction prior to accepting a guilty plea.  See United States v. Youngs, 687 
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criminal defense attorney was obligated to advise the defendant about 
the plea’s consequence on a subsequent civil proceeding,426 while an 
appellate judge on a different court opined that it demands advice 
about the law governing parole eligibility.427  The extensions in these 
cases, which have held that a defendant had a right to some advice on 
the various matters, certainly represent a benefit to defendants.428 
A different extension of Padilla, however, may prove less 
beneficial to defendants, including U.S. citizens, who face traditional 
penal consequences upon conviction.  Instead of the thorough 
investigation required by Strickland’s duty to investigate, Padilla places 
a constitutional imprimatur on a more superficial inquiry.  Unlike 
noncitizen defendants needing advice about immigration 
consequences, for whom Padilla’s two-tiered duty represents an 
expanded constitutional awareness of their interests, for criminal 
defendants generally, Padilla’s anomalous, relaxed duty to investigate 
offers the prospect of a diminished Sixth Amendment protection.  
That is, if lower courts, applying Padilla as another in the Strickland 
line of cases, interpret its two-tiered duty as a departure from the duty-
to-investigate standard that previously applied to guilt-stage inquiries 
and sentencing, criminal defendants will not receive the procedural 
protection they might otherwise have enjoyed. 
If courts follow this path, the measurement of constitutionally 
competent representation will not be the thorough investigation of 
relevant facts and law that courts time and again have required, but a 
reduced investigation standard akin to Padilla’s that tailors 
                                                        
F.3d 56, 61–63 (2d Cir. 2012) (declining to require courts to inform defendants about the 
possibility of civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person).  Some commentators ar-
gue that Padilla requires defense attorneys to advise defendants, regardless of immigration 
status, about non-immigration consequences of conviction.  See, e.g., Joanna Woolman, Pa-
dilla’s “Truly Clear” Test: A Case for a Broader Application in Minnesota, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 840, 848 (2011) (urging Minnesota courts to expand Padilla’s mandate to include 
advice about restrictions on parental custody, disqualification for professional licenses, and 
sex offender registration). 
 426.  See Wilson v. Alaska, 244 P.3d 535, 539 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (requiring, under 
Padilla, a criminal defense attorney to advise about a plea’s effect on subsequent civil pro-
ceedings related to damages arising for liability for civil assault and battery claims). 
 427.  Webb v. State, 334 S.W.3d 126, 136 (Mo. 2011) (Wolff, J., concurring). 
 428.  See Woolman, supra note 425, at 848–49; see also King, supra note 55, at 38 (arguing 
that Padilla “suggests the possibility of rethinking the federal constitutional right to coun-
sel” so as to provide appointed counsel to all criminal defendants not just those facing the 
possibility of incarceration). 
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constitutional competence to factual and legal complexity.429  An 
example involving tax law may help illustrate this point.  Like 
immigration law, tax law is a statutory nightmare; indeed, 
immigration law has been described as “‘second only to the Internal 
Revenue Code in complexity,’”430 so the analogy is especially 
appropriate.  Without question, a criminal defendant in a tax 
prosecution is entitled to the right to effective assistance of counsel.431  
To date, that has involved the duty to investigate the intricacies of the 
tax code’s criminal provisions.432  Much as civil immigration 
consequences sometimes arise from criminal convictions, some civil 
tax consequences arise from criminal tax convictions433 and, as with 
immigration consequences before Padilla, have been characterized as 
collateral consequences of conviction.434 
Is it possible that a court, building on Padilla, would conclude 
that the right to counsel requires that the criminal defense attorney 
provide the defendant with advice about the possible civil tax 
consequence?  The cases in which lower state and federal courts have 
used Padilla’s reasoning to impose such an obligation on defense 
attorneys about sex offender registration and other civil consequences 
certainly suggest that it is;435 so too do arguments that Padilla requires 
                                                        
 429.  See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (“When the law is not 
succinct and straightforward . . . a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise 
a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration 
consequences.”); see also supra note 420 and accompanying text. 
 430.  Castro-O’Ryan v. Dep’t of Immigr. & Naturalization, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 
1987) (quoting ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS OF ALIENS 107 (1985)). 
 431.  See, e.g., United States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199, 203–04 (4th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Schwartz, No. 1:08–CR–10, 2008 WL 2074018, at *1–2 (W.D. Mich. May 14, 2008). 
 432.  See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576, 578, 584 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying 
the right to counsel’s duty to investigate in a prosecution for conspiracy to defraud the 
United States and making false income tax returns); United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 
341, 349 (5th Cir. 1984) (same, but regarding mail fraud and conspiracy to defraud the 
United States by impeding the IRS’s functions). 
 433.  See, e.g., Considine v. United States, 683 F.2d 1285, 1287 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding 
that a civil tax penalty requiring proof that a taxpayer willfully submitted a false tax return 
could be shown through the existence of a prior tax crime conviction requiring proof of 
falsity). 
 434.  See United States v. Miss Smart Frocks, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) 
(discussing United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, 922 (2d Cir. 1954)). 
 435.  See supra note 425. 
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advice about, as one commentator put it, “direct” and “dire” 
consequences.436  But instead of applying the duty to thoroughly 
investigate tax law, a Padilla-inspired court would differentiate 
between clear and unclear consequences as the Padilla Court did.  
Such a mandate would require that if the civil tax penalty would 
clearly result from conviction, the defense attorney must advise 
accordingly, but if the tax code is not succinct and straightforward 
then the defense attorney must only advise that adverse tax 
consequences may arise.  There is no need to fully immerse oneself in 
complicated tax law; a modicum of investigation is all the 
Constitution requires.  For all the criticism that has been rightfully 
lodged at the Strickland line of cases, this would represent an signifi-
cant watering down of the duty to investigate.  Courts may have been 
too liberal in their interpretation of what constitute “strategic” 
choices, but at least they have held steadfast in their expectation that 
the Sixth Amendment requires defense attorneys to grapple with the 
law and facts that apply.437  A Padilla unhinged from its immigration 
law mooring threatens to rot even that tooth in Strickland’s bite. 
Admittedly, no court to date has applied Padilla’s two-tiered 
standard to the traditional criminal consequences of a conviction 
instead of the time-tested duty to investigate.  But just as numerous 
courts have borrowed Padilla’s reasoning to extend the right to 
counsel to some collateral consequences not expressly contemplated 
by the majority opinion,438 it is possible that courts will turn to Padilla 
as the new model for the Sixth Amendment duty to investigate.  
Padilla’s two-tiered standard, after all, arises from the Court’s 
awareness of deportation’s severity and “close connection to the 
criminal process,” and the Court’s realization that “[s]ome members 
of the bar who represent clients facing criminal charges . . . may not 
be well versed in [immigration law].”439  Despite the Court’s 
characterization of deportation as “unique” and at least one scholar’s 
powerful argument that “deportation is different,”440 lower courts 
applying Padilla have been less restrained.  To these courts and the 
                                                        
 436.  Woolman, supra note 425, at 841.  Another commentator argues that Padilla’s rea-
soning extends to “any consequence that is punitive and critical to the client and whose 
application is nondiscretionary.”  Brink, supra note 34, at 49. 
 437.  See supra Part II.A–B. 
 438.  See supra note 425. 
 439.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482–83 (2010). 
 440.  See generally Markowitz, supra note 13, at 1301 (arguing that deportation is neither 
a civil nor criminal proceeding, but rather something in between). 
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judges on other courts who have concurred or dissented in separate 
opinions, the characterizations that motivated the Padilla Court to act 
apply to other consequences of conviction.  Perhaps, then, it is only a 
matter of time before a court is asked to follow Padilla’s reasoning in a 
manner that contracts the constitutional protection previously 
afforded or does not expand the right to counsel’s benefit as much as 
would have occurred under the Court’s pre-Padilla duty-to-investigate 
jurisprudence. 
The historical record suggests that there is reason to remain 
vigilant.  Time and again, constitutional norms have been relaxed or 
altogether ignored when it comes to processing immigrants, only to 
expand or resurface later as a policy applied toward U.S. citizens as 
well.441  The Alien Enemies Act of 1789,442 for example, gives the 
President sweeping authorization to imprison, deport, and otherwise 
curtail the civil liberties of noncitizens deemed dangerous during 
wartime.443  It was twice used—during the War of 1812 and World War 
I—against citizens of countries against which the United States was at 
war, much as its title implies.444  During World War II, however, it 
became the basis for interning individuals of Japanese descent, 
whether U.S. citizens or not, partly due to lists of dangerous persons 
that the government acknowledged were unreliable.445  Over a period 
of time spanning both world wars, the FBI refined its efforts to curtail 
leftist political radicalism first by targeting noncitizens during the 
“Red Scare” that culminated in the Palmer Raids of 1919 and 1920, 
then by implementing similar tactics against U.S. citizen radicals 
during the McCarthy period of the 1940s and 1950s.446  In another 
example stretching from one war to another, the government has 
long been permitted to use secret evidence in immigration 
proceedings based on a post-World War II decision, Knauff v. 
                                                        
 441.  DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS 
IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 85 (2003); see also David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 
953, 989–1003 (2002) (describing various periods of U.S. history in which controversial 
policies designated for noncitizens were subsequently extended to U.S. citizens). 
 442.  Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, § 1, 1 Stat. 577 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2006)). 
 443.  Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 961, 992–94 (1998). 
 444.  COLE, supra note 441, at 92. 
 445.  Id. at 92–94. 
 446.  Cole, supra note 441, at 995–96.  
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Shaughnessy.447  After September 11, 2001, prosecutors sought to use 
secret evidence in criminal prosecutions of U.S. citizens deemed 
“enemy combatants.”448 
Likewise, law enforcement innovations have regularly been 
introduced to police immigration law, then applied toward other 
substantive areas.  Private prisons, for example, gained widespread use 
in the immigration context before they became popular for penal 
confinement.449  More recently, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or 
drones), which DHS has used for several years for border surveillance, 
                                                        
 447.  338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (allowing the Attorney General to exclude a noncitizen 
from the United States on the basis of “confidential” information).  For a more detailed 
discussion of the use of secret evidence in immigration proceedings, see Susan M. Akram 
& Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The 
Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 321–26 (2002). 
 448.  See COLE, supra note 441, at 178–79 (discussing the use of secret evidence against 
United States citizens José Padilla and Yasser Hamdi).  The federal government’s post-
September 11th efforts were further buttressed by the D.C. Circuit’s reliance on Knauff 
and a host of other immigration cases stretching back to the late nineteenth century’s Chi-
nese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), to reject the efforts of Uighur detainees held at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba to gain release into the United States.  Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 
F.3d 1022, 1025–26 (D.C. Cir. 2009), opinion reinstated as amended, after remand from Supreme 
Court, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010); KANSTROOM, supra note 294, at 180–83.  Though 
some detainees have since left Guantánamo, much of the same rationale continues to be 
used against others.  Ernesto Hernández-López, Kiyemba, Guantánamo, and Immigration 
Law: An Extraterritorial Constitution in a Plenary Power World, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 193, 194, 
198 n.16 (2012).  Hernández-López argues that the doctrinal reasoning provided in the 
Kiyemba decision is rooted in the plenary power doctrine developed in the immigration law 
context and “may impact detentions far beyond those concerning the Uighurs or Guantá-
namo”—namely, United States citizens over whom federal courts have habeas power but 
decline to exercise it as occurred in Munaf v. Green, 553 U.S. 674 (2008), involving United 
States citizens detained in Iraq by the United States military.  Hernández-López, supra, at 
222. 
 449.  See TOM BARRY, BORDER WARS 10–11 (2011) (“The Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service’s (INS) 1983 decision to outsource immigrant detention to the newly estab-
lished Corrections Corporation of America gave birth to the private-prison industry . . . .”); 
Richard Harding, Private Prisons, in CRIME & JUSTICE 265, 267 (2001) (describing contracts 
awarded by the Texas Department of Corrections to two private prison corporations in 
1988 as the moment in which private companies became “operators of ‘real’ prisons”); see 
generally MICHAEL WELCH, DETAINED: IMMIGRATION LAWS AND THE EXPANDING I.N.S. JAIL 
COMPLEX 162–66 (2002) (dating the private prison industry’s involvement in immigration 
detention to the 1980s). 
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have now been lent to local law enforcement officers to arrest U.S. 
citizens suspected of cattle rustling.450  Reports suggest that UAV use 
continues to expand for domestic security purposes as mundane as 
traffic violations.451 
This history suggests that the treatment of immigrants can at 
times be considered, to borrow a phrase from Professor Kevin R. 
Johnson, a “magic mirror” into the state of the law if existing legal 
protections ceased to exist.452  Law is not static.453  It evolves one policy 
initiative or judicial decision at a time and not even the keenest legal 
observer can predict where it will be in the months or years ahead.  In 
light of this history, Padilla’s Strickland-lite duty to investigate merits 
reevaluation: Will it remain focused on immigration consequences of 
conviction or continue branching out to include advice about other 
consequences?  Similarly, will it become the new standard for duty-to-
investigate inquiries or remain an anomaly? 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It is too early to know how Padilla and the Strickland line of cases 
will ultimately relate to one another.  Padilla undoubtedly extends 
some amount of Strickland protections to a new context: immigration 
consequences of conviction.454  Already, the Supreme Court has 
referenced Padilla in more recent Strickland-based right-to-counsel 
decisions, evidencing that it too views Padilla as one branch of a much 
larger jurisprudential body.455 
                                                        
 450.  North Dakota Police Using Predator Spy Drones, LOSS OF PRIVACY BLOG (Dec. 19, 2011), 
http://www.lossofprivacy.com/index.php/2011/12/north-dakota-police-using-predator-
spy-drones/; Nick Paumgarten, Here’s Looking at You, NEW YORKER, May 14, 2012, at 46. 
 451.  Steve Clemons, Air Force Drones Trail Civilian Auto Traffic in New Mexico, ATLANTIC 
(July 6, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/07/air-force-drones 
-trail-civilian-auto-traffic-in-new-mexico/259517/. 
 452.  KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS 14 (2004). 
 453.  See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (2005) (“The law embodies 
the story of a nation’s development through many centuries . . . .  In order to know what it 
is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become.”). 
 454.  See supra Part III.A–B. 
 455.  See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406 (2012) (noting that Padilla illus-
trates that there may be instances when claims of ineffective assistance can arise after the 
conviction is entered). 
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Padilla, however, fits into Strickland without the neat edges of a 
carefully packaged gift.  Its Strickland-lite duty to investigate, on its 
face, applies only to advice about the immigration consequences of 
conviction.456  Perhaps it will remain within that context where its 
impact is largely an improvement from the nonexistent requirement 
that prevailed prior to Padilla.  This alone is notable because, in the 
hands of zealous advocates, it has resulted in countless vacated 
convictions.457  In this sense, Padilla can be thought of as breathing life 
into Strickland.  Perhaps that quarter-century-old decision will 
continue to disappoint criminal law scholars.  To immigrants who 
want to remain in the United States despite a conviction and their 
attorneys, however, it offers a final glimmer of hope.  In effect, Padilla 
is a back end opportunity even where Strickland, at the front end of 
the crimmigration process, leaves much room for improvement. 
But perhaps Padilla’s Strickland-lite duty will not remain confined 
to advice about immigration consequences.  If Strickland-lite moves 
significantly away from its immigration-focused center, then all 
criminal defendants stand to lose an important aspect of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  We will have to wait much longer 
before we know whether it is Padilla’s rough edges that shape how it 
unravels or whether that process will be led by its more sanguine core.  
Until then, Padilla will continue to represent a much-needed 
improvement for most noncitizen defendants, while simultaneously 
continuing to represent a lost opportunity.458 
                                                        
 456.  See supra Part III.A–B. 
 457.  See supra notes 377–379 and accompanying text. 
 458.  See Vázquez, Realizing Padilla’s Promise, supra note 6, at 200 (observing that Padilla 
is “a landmark case” that nonetheless “falls short” of providing noncitizen defendants the 
advice they need to make an informed decision about pleading). 
